SPAC Performance, Ownership and Corporate Governance

Abstract

Purpose – We examine how the ownership and corporate governance of special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) influence their short- and long-run performance.

Design/methodology/approach – By splitting our sample at the median value of different governance characteristics, we test for differences in short- and long-run performance between the low and high governance groups.

Findings – We find weak evidence of a positive influence of board independence on performance, but no indication that either managerial or institutional ownership is associated with performance.

Research limitations/implications – The study provides further evidence on the open question of how governance characteristics affect firm performance.

Originality/value – We describe the unique conflicts that exist within a SPAC, and the recent evolution of their organizational structure in response to these conflicts.

Citation

Howe, J.S. and O’Brien, S.W. (2012), "SPAC Performance, Ownership and Corporate Governance", Ferris, S.P., John, K. and Makhija, A.K. (Ed.) Advances in Financial Economics (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 15), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-3732(2012)0000015003