Does corporate governance matter? Korean banks in the postfinancial crisis era

Abstract

The 1997 financial crisis in Asia has entailed significant changes and governance reforms in the Korean banking industry. This study investigates the impact of corporate governance on the risk and return of Korean banks during the 10 years that followed the financial crisis era. In particular, we investigate the ownership structure of banks, the extent of involvement of foreign institutions and investors in ownership and board membership of Korean banks, and the heterogeneity of board structure on bank performance. Our findings indicate that foreign ownership, the extent of external board involvement, and the presence of foreign directors on the board are associated with significantly higher bank returns. Although foreign ownership and the number of outside board directors are associated with lower risk, the involvement of foreign board members is positively associated with risk. The results are fairly robust to a battery of tests and control variables, and offer the first detailed empirical documentation of the Korean banking governance reform and its achievements since 1997.

Citation

Choi, S., Hasan, I. and Waisman, M. (2009), "Does corporate governance matter? Korean banks in the postfinancial crisis era", Hirschey, M., John, K. and Makhija, A.K. (Ed.) Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 13), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 217-241. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-3732(2009)0000013011