Board monitoring and access to debt financing

Abstract

Board monitoring should affect a firm's access to debt financing because it improves firm performance and the board is ultimately responsible for the firm's debt. In this study, we show empirically that access to debt financing indeed benefits in two ways from board monitoring: directly from the monitoring and indirectly from improvement in performance. The methodological challenge is in separating the two effects from each other and from those of other drivers of debt financing.

Citation

Wu, Z. and Chua, J. (2009), "Board monitoring and access to debt financing", Hirschey, M., John, K. and Makhija, A.K. (Ed.) Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 13), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 119-137. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-3732(2009)0000013007