Some Notes on Cournot and the Bargaining Problem
Including a Symposium on the Historical Epistemology of Economics
ISBN: 978-1-78714-538-2, eISBN: 978-1-78714-537-5
Publication date: 15 September 2017
Abstract
The basic ideas of Cournot and those who came after him are related to the recent work of Nash and his notion of an “equilibrium point.” It is shown that the Nash equilibrium point incorporates the main contribution of Cournot to the solution of the duopoly problem and that the major criticism that may be made against the Cournot equilibrium may also be made against the Nash equilibrium. It is then indicated to what use this weakness might be put in the study of bargaining.
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Acknowledgements
Acknowledgments
I am indebted to Olav Bjerkholt for unearthing this paper, which I wrote during the summer of 1953, in the course of his research on the history of the Cowles Foundation. The foreword to this paper explaining the significance of the paper to the history and development of two-person bargaining games was written by Olav Bjerkholt.
Olav Bjerkholt is most grateful for insightful and generous advice from Geir Asheim. He is also thankful to Martin Dufwenberg and Robert Dimand for advice and to Ge Ge for excellent research assistance.
Citation
Nerlove, M. (2017), "Some Notes on Cournot and the Bargaining Problem", Including a Symposium on the Historical Epistemology of Economics (Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology, Vol. 35A), Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 179-189. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0743-41542017000035A009
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2017 Emerald Publishing Limited