Index
The Law and Economics of Privacy, Personal Data, Artificial Intelligence, and Incomplete Monitoring
ISBN: 978-1-80262-002-3, eISBN: 978-1-80262-001-6
ISSN: 0193-5895
Publication date: 22 March 2022
This content is currently only available as a PDF
Citation
(2022), "Index", Langenfeld, J., Fagan, F. and Clark, S. (Ed.) The Law and Economics of Privacy, Personal Data, Artificial Intelligence, and Incomplete Monitoring (Research in Law and Economics, Vol. 30), Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 201-204. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-589520220000030015
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2022 James Langenfeld, Frank Fagan and Samuel Clark. Published under exclusive licence by Emerald Publishing Limited
INDEX
Abstract idea doctrine, 60–61
Advanced analytics, 35–37
Alice Corp
, 2, 61
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 60
Antitrust implications, 178–180
Artificial intelligence (AI), 2, 60
abstract ideas in, 60–62
patenting under uncertainty, 62–65
Asset management companies (AMCs), 191–192
as evaluators, 191–192
Banking, 190
Behavioral economics, 32
Big data, 4, 30
Big Four banks, 191, 193, 197
Californian Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA), 31, 36
Central Data Protection Principles of European, Indian, and Californian Data Protection Law, 47–52
control and information rights, 48–50
deidentification policies, 50–52
Check-the-box rules, 110
China
Big Four banks, 191, 193, 197
economic development, 190
nonperforming loans and asset management companies, 191–192
Complete monitoring, 109
Compliance, 110
Conformity costs, 39
Cost of compliance, 112–113
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 36–37, 50–51
Cumulative distribution function (CDF), 122
Data, 4
minimization, 50
protection, 1–2, 43, 52
Deadweight loss (DWL), 132–133, 135–136
“Deidentification” policy, 46–47, 50, 52
Digital communication technologies, 4
Digital subscriber-line (DSL), 173
Displacement ratio, 175
Downstream price floor protects against vertical price squeeze, 175
downstream P-F constraint, 175
“Dual-track” development program, 191
Economic regulation implications, 178–180
Efficient component pricing rule (ECPR), 175
Efficient markets
market prices, 89–90
prices display, 88–89
properties of, 86–91
security price movements, 86–88
valuation efficiency, 90–91
Ex ante materiality test, 99–100
Forecastability, 96
Foreign-invested banks, 193–195
Formal characterization
of simple informational efficiency, 98–99
of valuation efficiency, 99
Formal model, 98
Fraud on the Market (FOTM), 84, 86
“Free information” policy, 45–46
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 4, 31, 36–37, 51
Generalization of Samuelson’s theorem, 101–103
Grant and rejection of patent applications, 71–74
Horn’s parallel analysis, 78
Incomplete monitoring, 111
high compliance cost, 127–130
literature, 115–117
lower compliance costs, 130–132
market effects, 132–137
model, 112, 117, 125
results, 125–137
Informal lending, 195–196
Informational efficiency, 91–92
Joint-hypothesis problem, 90–91
Knowledge discovery in data (KDD), 30, 36, 41
Knowledge gain, 43–52
Law and economics, 172, 191
Legal norms, 110, 116
Legal standards, 112
Liberty, 109
Linkline
, 173
Market effects, 132–137
Market efficiency in 10B-5 litigation, 83–85
efficiency properties in securities fraud litigation, 93–97
formal characterization of efficiency properties, 98–104
informational vs. valuation efficiency, 91–92
properties of efficient markets, 86–91
Market prices, 89–90
Materiality, 86–87
“Maximum privacy” policy, 46
Myopic consumers, 4–5
market for data, 9–15
market regulation, 15–22
model, 6–8
no market for data, 8–9
Negative liberty, 38
Non-exclusionary price floors
assumptions, definitions, and notation, 174–175
downstream price floor protects against vertical price squeeze, 175
policy implications, 178–181
two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
Noncompliance, 110
Nonforecastability, 90
Nonperforming loans (NPL), 191–192
Optimization of trade-offs, 43–52
P2P lending, 195–196
Patent Act, 60
Patent Examination Data System (PEDS), 62–63
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 68–69
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 61–62
Patent(s), 2
claim, 60
eligibility, 60–63
legislation, 60
policy, 66
Patentable subject matter, 60–61
Pattern day trader, 97
Penalty, 110
multiplier, 112, 115–116
regime, 114
Permitted noncompliance, 111
Personal data, 30
use of, 30
Personal Data Protection Bill (PDP Bill 2019), 31, 2019
Price discrimination, 5, 7–8
Price squeeze, 172, 175
Price-floor constraints (P-F constraints), 172
Privacy, 1–2, 4, 30–31, 43, 52, 109
regulation, 6
self-management, 49–50
as vulnerability protection, 31–42
Private banks, 193–195
Purpose limitation, 50
Puzzles, 190
Regulated parties, 117
Regulation, 4
Regulators, 109, 111
Reliance, 84
Retail displacement ratio, 175
Right to be forgotten, 4–5, 16, 19
Right to be informed, 4–5, 15–16
Right to erasure. See Right to be forgotten
Risk, 32
of harm, 43–52
Risk-neutral probability
derivation of, 103–104
function, 104
“Risk-neutral” distribution, 103
Rules and standards, 111, 113, 115–116
Ruling out securities price forecastability, 100–104
Sabotage, 172
Safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Samuelson’s nonforecastability theorem, 100–101
Securities fraud litigation, 2
current practice in, 93–94
efficiency properties in, 93–97
extensive informational efficiency, 95–96
market prices, 96
plaintiff believes market prices, 96–97
violations of law of one price, 94–95
Securities law, 190
Security price movements, 86–88
Shadow-banking, forms of, 196–197
Sherman Act, 172
Social norms, 116
Sophisticated consumer, 4–6
State’s governance model, 190
Substantial authority, 114
Supreme Court, 61
Surplus, 4–5
Time-consistent decisions, 8
Traditional banks, 196
Trinko
, 173
Two-part test, 61–62
Two-period model, 6
Two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Uncertainty, 41–42, 62
patenting under, 62–65
score, 74–81
Undercompliance, 111
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 62–63
Upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
upstream P-F constraint, 176
Valuation efficiency, 90–92
Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs), 178, 180–181
Vertical mergers, 180
Vertically integrated firm (VIF), 172–173
Vulnerability protection, 30
costs related to data use interferes with privacy, 37–39
differences to informational perspectives, 33–35
privacy as, 31–42
scope and limits of privacy in context of commercial data exploitation, 35–37
social amplification and catastrophic outcomes, 41
uncertainty, 41–42
Wealth management products, 197
WeBank, 194–195
Wholesale displacement ratio, 175
Abstract idea doctrine
, 60–61
Advanced analytics
, 35–37
Alice Corp
, 2, 61
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International
, 60
Antitrust implications
, 178–180
Artificial intelligence (AI)
, 2, 60
abstract ideas in
, 60–62
patenting under uncertainty
, 62–65
Asset management companies (AMCs)
, 191–192
as evaluators
, 191–192
Banking
, 190
Behavioral economics
, 32
Big data
, 4, 30
Big Four banks
, 191, 193, 197
Californian Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA), 31, 36
Central Data Protection Principles of European, Indian, and Californian Data Protection Law, 47–52
control and information rights, 48–50
deidentification policies, 50–52
Check-the-box rules, 110
China
Big Four banks, 191, 193, 197
economic development, 190
nonperforming loans and asset management companies, 191–192
Complete monitoring, 109
Compliance, 110
Conformity costs, 39
Cost of compliance, 112–113
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 36–37, 50–51
Cumulative distribution function (CDF), 122
Data, 4
minimization, 50
protection, 1–2, 43, 52
Deadweight loss (DWL), 132–133, 135–136
“Deidentification” policy, 46–47, 50, 52
Digital communication technologies, 4
Digital subscriber-line (DSL), 173
Displacement ratio, 175
Downstream price floor protects against vertical price squeeze, 175
downstream P-F constraint, 175
“Dual-track” development program, 191
Economic regulation implications, 178–180
Efficient component pricing rule (ECPR), 175
Efficient markets
market prices, 89–90
prices display, 88–89
properties of, 86–91
security price movements, 86–88
valuation efficiency, 90–91
Ex ante materiality test, 99–100
Forecastability, 96
Foreign-invested banks, 193–195
Formal characterization
of simple informational efficiency, 98–99
of valuation efficiency, 99
Formal model, 98
Fraud on the Market (FOTM), 84, 86
“Free information” policy, 45–46
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 4, 31, 36–37, 51
Generalization of Samuelson’s theorem, 101–103
Grant and rejection of patent applications, 71–74
Horn’s parallel analysis, 78
Incomplete monitoring, 111
high compliance cost, 127–130
literature, 115–117
lower compliance costs, 130–132
market effects, 132–137
model, 112, 117, 125
results, 125–137
Informal lending, 195–196
Informational efficiency, 91–92
Joint-hypothesis problem, 90–91
Knowledge discovery in data (KDD), 30, 36, 41
Knowledge gain, 43–52
Law and economics, 172, 191
Legal norms, 110, 116
Legal standards, 112
Liberty, 109
Linkline
, 173
Market effects, 132–137
Market efficiency in 10B-5 litigation, 83–85
efficiency properties in securities fraud litigation, 93–97
formal characterization of efficiency properties, 98–104
informational vs. valuation efficiency, 91–92
properties of efficient markets, 86–91
Market prices, 89–90
Materiality, 86–87
“Maximum privacy” policy, 46
Myopic consumers, 4–5
market for data, 9–15
market regulation, 15–22
model, 6–8
no market for data, 8–9
Negative liberty, 38
Non-exclusionary price floors
assumptions, definitions, and notation, 174–175
downstream price floor protects against vertical price squeeze, 175
policy implications, 178–181
two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
Noncompliance, 110
Nonforecastability, 90
Nonperforming loans (NPL), 191–192
Optimization of trade-offs, 43–52
P2P lending, 195–196
Patent Act, 60
Patent Examination Data System (PEDS), 62–63
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 68–69
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 61–62
Patent(s), 2
claim, 60
eligibility, 60–63
legislation, 60
policy, 66
Patentable subject matter, 60–61
Pattern day trader, 97
Penalty, 110
multiplier, 112, 115–116
regime, 114
Permitted noncompliance, 111
Personal data, 30
use of, 30
Personal Data Protection Bill (PDP Bill 2019), 31, 2019
Price discrimination, 5, 7–8
Price squeeze, 172, 175
Price-floor constraints (P-F constraints), 172
Privacy, 1–2, 4, 30–31, 43, 52, 109
regulation, 6
self-management, 49–50
as vulnerability protection, 31–42
Private banks, 193–195
Purpose limitation, 50
Puzzles, 190
Regulated parties, 117
Regulation, 4
Regulators, 109, 111
Reliance, 84
Retail displacement ratio, 175
Right to be forgotten, 4–5, 16, 19
Right to be informed, 4–5, 15–16
Right to erasure. See Right to be forgotten
Risk, 32
of harm, 43–52
Risk-neutral probability
derivation of, 103–104
function, 104
“Risk-neutral” distribution, 103
Rules and standards, 111, 113, 115–116
Ruling out securities price forecastability, 100–104
Sabotage, 172
Safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Samuelson’s nonforecastability theorem, 100–101
Securities fraud litigation, 2
current practice in, 93–94
efficiency properties in, 93–97
extensive informational efficiency, 95–96
market prices, 96
plaintiff believes market prices, 96–97
violations of law of one price, 94–95
Securities law, 190
Security price movements, 86–88
Shadow-banking, forms of, 196–197
Sherman Act, 172
Social norms, 116
Sophisticated consumer, 4–6
State’s governance model, 190
Substantial authority, 114
Supreme Court, 61
Surplus, 4–5
Time-consistent decisions, 8
Traditional banks, 196
Trinko
, 173
Two-part test, 61–62
Two-period model, 6
Two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Uncertainty, 41–42, 62
patenting under, 62–65
score, 74–81
Undercompliance, 111
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 62–63
Upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
upstream P-F constraint, 176
Valuation efficiency, 90–92
Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs), 178, 180–181
Vertical mergers, 180
Vertically integrated firm (VIF), 172–173
Vulnerability protection, 30
costs related to data use interferes with privacy, 37–39
differences to informational perspectives, 33–35
privacy as, 31–42
scope and limits of privacy in context of commercial data exploitation, 35–37
social amplification and catastrophic outcomes, 41
uncertainty, 41–42
Wealth management products, 197
WeBank, 194–195
Wholesale displacement ratio, 175
Californian Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA)
, 31, 36
Central Data Protection Principles of European, Indian, and Californian Data Protection Law
, 47–52
control and information rights
, 48–50
deidentification policies
, 50–52
Check-the-box rules
, 110
China
Big Four banks
, 191, 193, 197
economic development
, 190
nonperforming loans and asset management companies
, 191–192
Complete monitoring
, 109
Compliance
, 110
Conformity costs
, 39
Cost of compliance
, 112–113
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
, 36–37, 50–51
Cumulative distribution function (CDF)
, 122
Data
, 4
minimization
, 50
protection
, 1–2, 43, 52
Deadweight loss (DWL)
, 132–133, 135–136
“Deidentification” policy
, 46–47, 50, 52
Digital communication technologies
, 4
Digital subscriber-line (DSL)
, 173
Displacement ratio
, 175
Downstream price floor protects against vertical price squeeze
, 175
downstream P-F constraint
, 175
“Dual-track” development program
, 191
Economic regulation implications, 178–180
Efficient component pricing rule (ECPR), 175
Efficient markets
market prices, 89–90
prices display, 88–89
properties of, 86–91
security price movements, 86–88
valuation efficiency, 90–91
Ex ante materiality test, 99–100
Forecastability, 96
Foreign-invested banks, 193–195
Formal characterization
of simple informational efficiency, 98–99
of valuation efficiency, 99
Formal model, 98
Fraud on the Market (FOTM), 84, 86
“Free information” policy, 45–46
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 4, 31, 36–37, 51
Generalization of Samuelson’s theorem, 101–103
Grant and rejection of patent applications, 71–74
Horn’s parallel analysis, 78
Incomplete monitoring, 111
high compliance cost, 127–130
literature, 115–117
lower compliance costs, 130–132
market effects, 132–137
model, 112, 117, 125
results, 125–137
Informal lending, 195–196
Informational efficiency, 91–92
Joint-hypothesis problem, 90–91
Knowledge discovery in data (KDD), 30, 36, 41
Knowledge gain, 43–52
Law and economics, 172, 191
Legal norms, 110, 116
Legal standards, 112
Liberty, 109
Linkline
, 173
Market effects, 132–137
Market efficiency in 10B-5 litigation, 83–85
efficiency properties in securities fraud litigation, 93–97
formal characterization of efficiency properties, 98–104
informational vs. valuation efficiency, 91–92
properties of efficient markets, 86–91
Market prices, 89–90
Materiality, 86–87
“Maximum privacy” policy, 46
Myopic consumers, 4–5
market for data, 9–15
market regulation, 15–22
model, 6–8
no market for data, 8–9
Negative liberty, 38
Non-exclusionary price floors
assumptions, definitions, and notation, 174–175
downstream price floor protects against vertical price squeeze, 175
policy implications, 178–181
two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
Noncompliance, 110
Nonforecastability, 90
Nonperforming loans (NPL), 191–192
Optimization of trade-offs, 43–52
P2P lending, 195–196
Patent Act, 60
Patent Examination Data System (PEDS), 62–63
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 68–69
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 61–62
Patent(s), 2
claim, 60
eligibility, 60–63
legislation, 60
policy, 66
Patentable subject matter, 60–61
Pattern day trader, 97
Penalty, 110
multiplier, 112, 115–116
regime, 114
Permitted noncompliance, 111
Personal data, 30
use of, 30
Personal Data Protection Bill (PDP Bill 2019), 31, 2019
Price discrimination, 5, 7–8
Price squeeze, 172, 175
Price-floor constraints (P-F constraints), 172
Privacy, 1–2, 4, 30–31, 43, 52, 109
regulation, 6
self-management, 49–50
as vulnerability protection, 31–42
Private banks, 193–195
Purpose limitation, 50
Puzzles, 190
Regulated parties, 117
Regulation, 4
Regulators, 109, 111
Reliance, 84
Retail displacement ratio, 175
Right to be forgotten, 4–5, 16, 19
Right to be informed, 4–5, 15–16
Right to erasure. See Right to be forgotten
Risk, 32
of harm, 43–52
Risk-neutral probability
derivation of, 103–104
function, 104
“Risk-neutral” distribution, 103
Rules and standards, 111, 113, 115–116
Ruling out securities price forecastability, 100–104
Sabotage, 172
Safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Samuelson’s nonforecastability theorem, 100–101
Securities fraud litigation, 2
current practice in, 93–94
efficiency properties in, 93–97
extensive informational efficiency, 95–96
market prices, 96
plaintiff believes market prices, 96–97
violations of law of one price, 94–95
Securities law, 190
Security price movements, 86–88
Shadow-banking, forms of, 196–197
Sherman Act, 172
Social norms, 116
Sophisticated consumer, 4–6
State’s governance model, 190
Substantial authority, 114
Supreme Court, 61
Surplus, 4–5
Time-consistent decisions, 8
Traditional banks, 196
Trinko
, 173
Two-part test, 61–62
Two-period model, 6
Two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Uncertainty, 41–42, 62
patenting under, 62–65
score, 74–81
Undercompliance, 111
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 62–63
Upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
upstream P-F constraint, 176
Valuation efficiency, 90–92
Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs), 178, 180–181
Vertical mergers, 180
Vertically integrated firm (VIF), 172–173
Vulnerability protection, 30
costs related to data use interferes with privacy, 37–39
differences to informational perspectives, 33–35
privacy as, 31–42
scope and limits of privacy in context of commercial data exploitation, 35–37
social amplification and catastrophic outcomes, 41
uncertainty, 41–42
Wealth management products, 197
WeBank, 194–195
Wholesale displacement ratio, 175
Economic regulation implications
, 178–180
Efficient component pricing rule (ECPR)
, 175
Efficient markets
market prices
, 89–90
prices display
, 88–89
properties of
, 86–91
security price movements
, 86–88
valuation efficiency
, 90–91
Ex ante materiality test
, 99–100
Forecastability
, 96
Foreign-invested banks
, 193–195
Formal characterization
of simple informational efficiency
, 98–99
of valuation efficiency
, 99
Formal model
, 98
Fraud on the Market (FOTM)
, 84, 86
“Free information” policy
, 45–46
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 4, 31, 36–37, 51
Generalization of Samuelson’s theorem, 101–103
Grant and rejection of patent applications, 71–74
Horn’s parallel analysis, 78
Incomplete monitoring, 111
high compliance cost, 127–130
literature, 115–117
lower compliance costs, 130–132
market effects, 132–137
model, 112, 117, 125
results, 125–137
Informal lending, 195–196
Informational efficiency, 91–92
Joint-hypothesis problem, 90–91
Knowledge discovery in data (KDD), 30, 36, 41
Knowledge gain, 43–52
Law and economics, 172, 191
Legal norms, 110, 116
Legal standards, 112
Liberty, 109
Linkline
, 173
Market effects, 132–137
Market efficiency in 10B-5 litigation, 83–85
efficiency properties in securities fraud litigation, 93–97
formal characterization of efficiency properties, 98–104
informational vs. valuation efficiency, 91–92
properties of efficient markets, 86–91
Market prices, 89–90
Materiality, 86–87
“Maximum privacy” policy, 46
Myopic consumers, 4–5
market for data, 9–15
market regulation, 15–22
model, 6–8
no market for data, 8–9
Negative liberty, 38
Non-exclusionary price floors
assumptions, definitions, and notation, 174–175
downstream price floor protects against vertical price squeeze, 175
policy implications, 178–181
two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
Noncompliance, 110
Nonforecastability, 90
Nonperforming loans (NPL), 191–192
Optimization of trade-offs, 43–52
P2P lending, 195–196
Patent Act, 60
Patent Examination Data System (PEDS), 62–63
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 68–69
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 61–62
Patent(s), 2
claim, 60
eligibility, 60–63
legislation, 60
policy, 66
Patentable subject matter, 60–61
Pattern day trader, 97
Penalty, 110
multiplier, 112, 115–116
regime, 114
Permitted noncompliance, 111
Personal data, 30
use of, 30
Personal Data Protection Bill (PDP Bill 2019), 31, 2019
Price discrimination, 5, 7–8
Price squeeze, 172, 175
Price-floor constraints (P-F constraints), 172
Privacy, 1–2, 4, 30–31, 43, 52, 109
regulation, 6
self-management, 49–50
as vulnerability protection, 31–42
Private banks, 193–195
Purpose limitation, 50
Puzzles, 190
Regulated parties, 117
Regulation, 4
Regulators, 109, 111
Reliance, 84
Retail displacement ratio, 175
Right to be forgotten, 4–5, 16, 19
Right to be informed, 4–5, 15–16
Right to erasure. See Right to be forgotten
Risk, 32
of harm, 43–52
Risk-neutral probability
derivation of, 103–104
function, 104
“Risk-neutral” distribution, 103
Rules and standards, 111, 113, 115–116
Ruling out securities price forecastability, 100–104
Sabotage, 172
Safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Samuelson’s nonforecastability theorem, 100–101
Securities fraud litigation, 2
current practice in, 93–94
efficiency properties in, 93–97
extensive informational efficiency, 95–96
market prices, 96
plaintiff believes market prices, 96–97
violations of law of one price, 94–95
Securities law, 190
Security price movements, 86–88
Shadow-banking, forms of, 196–197
Sherman Act, 172
Social norms, 116
Sophisticated consumer, 4–6
State’s governance model, 190
Substantial authority, 114
Supreme Court, 61
Surplus, 4–5
Time-consistent decisions, 8
Traditional banks, 196
Trinko
, 173
Two-part test, 61–62
Two-period model, 6
Two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Uncertainty, 41–42, 62
patenting under, 62–65
score, 74–81
Undercompliance, 111
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 62–63
Upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
upstream P-F constraint, 176
Valuation efficiency, 90–92
Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs), 178, 180–181
Vertical mergers, 180
Vertically integrated firm (VIF), 172–173
Vulnerability protection, 30
costs related to data use interferes with privacy, 37–39
differences to informational perspectives, 33–35
privacy as, 31–42
scope and limits of privacy in context of commercial data exploitation, 35–37
social amplification and catastrophic outcomes, 41
uncertainty, 41–42
Wealth management products, 197
WeBank, 194–195
Wholesale displacement ratio, 175
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
, 4, 31, 36–37, 51
Generalization of Samuelson’s theorem
, 101–103
Grant and rejection of patent applications
, 71–74
Horn’s parallel analysis
, 78
Incomplete monitoring, 111
high compliance cost, 127–130
literature, 115–117
lower compliance costs, 130–132
market effects, 132–137
model, 112, 117, 125
results, 125–137
Informal lending, 195–196
Informational efficiency, 91–92
Joint-hypothesis problem, 90–91
Knowledge discovery in data (KDD), 30, 36, 41
Knowledge gain, 43–52
Law and economics, 172, 191
Legal norms, 110, 116
Legal standards, 112
Liberty, 109
Linkline
, 173
Market effects, 132–137
Market efficiency in 10B-5 litigation, 83–85
efficiency properties in securities fraud litigation, 93–97
formal characterization of efficiency properties, 98–104
informational vs. valuation efficiency, 91–92
properties of efficient markets, 86–91
Market prices, 89–90
Materiality, 86–87
“Maximum privacy” policy, 46
Myopic consumers, 4–5
market for data, 9–15
market regulation, 15–22
model, 6–8
no market for data, 8–9
Negative liberty, 38
Non-exclusionary price floors
assumptions, definitions, and notation, 174–175
downstream price floor protects against vertical price squeeze, 175
policy implications, 178–181
two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
Noncompliance, 110
Nonforecastability, 90
Nonperforming loans (NPL), 191–192
Optimization of trade-offs, 43–52
P2P lending, 195–196
Patent Act, 60
Patent Examination Data System (PEDS), 62–63
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 68–69
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 61–62
Patent(s), 2
claim, 60
eligibility, 60–63
legislation, 60
policy, 66
Patentable subject matter, 60–61
Pattern day trader, 97
Penalty, 110
multiplier, 112, 115–116
regime, 114
Permitted noncompliance, 111
Personal data, 30
use of, 30
Personal Data Protection Bill (PDP Bill 2019), 31, 2019
Price discrimination, 5, 7–8
Price squeeze, 172, 175
Price-floor constraints (P-F constraints), 172
Privacy, 1–2, 4, 30–31, 43, 52, 109
regulation, 6
self-management, 49–50
as vulnerability protection, 31–42
Private banks, 193–195
Purpose limitation, 50
Puzzles, 190
Regulated parties, 117
Regulation, 4
Regulators, 109, 111
Reliance, 84
Retail displacement ratio, 175
Right to be forgotten, 4–5, 16, 19
Right to be informed, 4–5, 15–16
Right to erasure. See Right to be forgotten
Risk, 32
of harm, 43–52
Risk-neutral probability
derivation of, 103–104
function, 104
“Risk-neutral” distribution, 103
Rules and standards, 111, 113, 115–116
Ruling out securities price forecastability, 100–104
Sabotage, 172
Safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Samuelson’s nonforecastability theorem, 100–101
Securities fraud litigation, 2
current practice in, 93–94
efficiency properties in, 93–97
extensive informational efficiency, 95–96
market prices, 96
plaintiff believes market prices, 96–97
violations of law of one price, 94–95
Securities law, 190
Security price movements, 86–88
Shadow-banking, forms of, 196–197
Sherman Act, 172
Social norms, 116
Sophisticated consumer, 4–6
State’s governance model, 190
Substantial authority, 114
Supreme Court, 61
Surplus, 4–5
Time-consistent decisions, 8
Traditional banks, 196
Trinko
, 173
Two-part test, 61–62
Two-period model, 6
Two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Uncertainty, 41–42, 62
patenting under, 62–65
score, 74–81
Undercompliance, 111
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 62–63
Upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
upstream P-F constraint, 176
Valuation efficiency, 90–92
Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs), 178, 180–181
Vertical mergers, 180
Vertically integrated firm (VIF), 172–173
Vulnerability protection, 30
costs related to data use interferes with privacy, 37–39
differences to informational perspectives, 33–35
privacy as, 31–42
scope and limits of privacy in context of commercial data exploitation, 35–37
social amplification and catastrophic outcomes, 41
uncertainty, 41–42
Wealth management products, 197
WeBank, 194–195
Wholesale displacement ratio, 175
Incomplete monitoring
, 111
high compliance cost
, 127–130
literature
, 115–117
lower compliance costs
, 130–132
market effects
, 132–137
model
, 112, 117, 125
results
, 125–137
Informal lending
, 195–196
Informational efficiency
, 91–92
Joint-hypothesis problem
, 90–91
Knowledge discovery in data (KDD), 30, 36, 41
Knowledge gain, 43–52
Law and economics, 172, 191
Legal norms, 110, 116
Legal standards, 112
Liberty, 109
Linkline
, 173
Market effects, 132–137
Market efficiency in 10B-5 litigation, 83–85
efficiency properties in securities fraud litigation, 93–97
formal characterization of efficiency properties, 98–104
informational vs. valuation efficiency, 91–92
properties of efficient markets, 86–91
Market prices, 89–90
Materiality, 86–87
“Maximum privacy” policy, 46
Myopic consumers, 4–5
market for data, 9–15
market regulation, 15–22
model, 6–8
no market for data, 8–9
Negative liberty, 38
Non-exclusionary price floors
assumptions, definitions, and notation, 174–175
downstream price floor protects against vertical price squeeze, 175
policy implications, 178–181
two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
Noncompliance, 110
Nonforecastability, 90
Nonperforming loans (NPL), 191–192
Optimization of trade-offs, 43–52
P2P lending, 195–196
Patent Act, 60
Patent Examination Data System (PEDS), 62–63
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 68–69
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 61–62
Patent(s), 2
claim, 60
eligibility, 60–63
legislation, 60
policy, 66
Patentable subject matter, 60–61
Pattern day trader, 97
Penalty, 110
multiplier, 112, 115–116
regime, 114
Permitted noncompliance, 111
Personal data, 30
use of, 30
Personal Data Protection Bill (PDP Bill 2019), 31, 2019
Price discrimination, 5, 7–8
Price squeeze, 172, 175
Price-floor constraints (P-F constraints), 172
Privacy, 1–2, 4, 30–31, 43, 52, 109
regulation, 6
self-management, 49–50
as vulnerability protection, 31–42
Private banks, 193–195
Purpose limitation, 50
Puzzles, 190
Regulated parties, 117
Regulation, 4
Regulators, 109, 111
Reliance, 84
Retail displacement ratio, 175
Right to be forgotten, 4–5, 16, 19
Right to be informed, 4–5, 15–16
Right to erasure. See Right to be forgotten
Risk, 32
of harm, 43–52
Risk-neutral probability
derivation of, 103–104
function, 104
“Risk-neutral” distribution, 103
Rules and standards, 111, 113, 115–116
Ruling out securities price forecastability, 100–104
Sabotage, 172
Safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Samuelson’s nonforecastability theorem, 100–101
Securities fraud litigation, 2
current practice in, 93–94
efficiency properties in, 93–97
extensive informational efficiency, 95–96
market prices, 96
plaintiff believes market prices, 96–97
violations of law of one price, 94–95
Securities law, 190
Security price movements, 86–88
Shadow-banking, forms of, 196–197
Sherman Act, 172
Social norms, 116
Sophisticated consumer, 4–6
State’s governance model, 190
Substantial authority, 114
Supreme Court, 61
Surplus, 4–5
Time-consistent decisions, 8
Traditional banks, 196
Trinko
, 173
Two-part test, 61–62
Two-period model, 6
Two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Uncertainty, 41–42, 62
patenting under, 62–65
score, 74–81
Undercompliance, 111
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 62–63
Upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
upstream P-F constraint, 176
Valuation efficiency, 90–92
Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs), 178, 180–181
Vertical mergers, 180
Vertically integrated firm (VIF), 172–173
Vulnerability protection, 30
costs related to data use interferes with privacy, 37–39
differences to informational perspectives, 33–35
privacy as, 31–42
scope and limits of privacy in context of commercial data exploitation, 35–37
social amplification and catastrophic outcomes, 41
uncertainty, 41–42
Wealth management products, 197
WeBank, 194–195
Wholesale displacement ratio, 175
Knowledge discovery in data (KDD)
, 30, 36, 41
Knowledge gain
, 43–52
Law and economics
, 172, 191
Legal norms
, 110, 116
Legal standards
, 112
Liberty
, 109
Linkline
, 173
Market effects, 132–137
Market efficiency in 10B-5 litigation, 83–85
efficiency properties in securities fraud litigation, 93–97
formal characterization of efficiency properties, 98–104
informational vs. valuation efficiency, 91–92
properties of efficient markets, 86–91
Market prices, 89–90
Materiality, 86–87
“Maximum privacy” policy, 46
Myopic consumers, 4–5
market for data, 9–15
market regulation, 15–22
model, 6–8
no market for data, 8–9
Negative liberty, 38
Non-exclusionary price floors
assumptions, definitions, and notation, 174–175
downstream price floor protects against vertical price squeeze, 175
policy implications, 178–181
two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
Noncompliance, 110
Nonforecastability, 90
Nonperforming loans (NPL), 191–192
Optimization of trade-offs, 43–52
P2P lending, 195–196
Patent Act, 60
Patent Examination Data System (PEDS), 62–63
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 68–69
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 61–62
Patent(s), 2
claim, 60
eligibility, 60–63
legislation, 60
policy, 66
Patentable subject matter, 60–61
Pattern day trader, 97
Penalty, 110
multiplier, 112, 115–116
regime, 114
Permitted noncompliance, 111
Personal data, 30
use of, 30
Personal Data Protection Bill (PDP Bill 2019), 31, 2019
Price discrimination, 5, 7–8
Price squeeze, 172, 175
Price-floor constraints (P-F constraints), 172
Privacy, 1–2, 4, 30–31, 43, 52, 109
regulation, 6
self-management, 49–50
as vulnerability protection, 31–42
Private banks, 193–195
Purpose limitation, 50
Puzzles, 190
Regulated parties, 117
Regulation, 4
Regulators, 109, 111
Reliance, 84
Retail displacement ratio, 175
Right to be forgotten, 4–5, 16, 19
Right to be informed, 4–5, 15–16
Right to erasure. See Right to be forgotten
Risk, 32
of harm, 43–52
Risk-neutral probability
derivation of, 103–104
function, 104
“Risk-neutral” distribution, 103
Rules and standards, 111, 113, 115–116
Ruling out securities price forecastability, 100–104
Sabotage, 172
Safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Samuelson’s nonforecastability theorem, 100–101
Securities fraud litigation, 2
current practice in, 93–94
efficiency properties in, 93–97
extensive informational efficiency, 95–96
market prices, 96
plaintiff believes market prices, 96–97
violations of law of one price, 94–95
Securities law, 190
Security price movements, 86–88
Shadow-banking, forms of, 196–197
Sherman Act, 172
Social norms, 116
Sophisticated consumer, 4–6
State’s governance model, 190
Substantial authority, 114
Supreme Court, 61
Surplus, 4–5
Time-consistent decisions, 8
Traditional banks, 196
Trinko
, 173
Two-part test, 61–62
Two-period model, 6
Two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Uncertainty, 41–42, 62
patenting under, 62–65
score, 74–81
Undercompliance, 111
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 62–63
Upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
upstream P-F constraint, 176
Valuation efficiency, 90–92
Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs), 178, 180–181
Vertical mergers, 180
Vertically integrated firm (VIF), 172–173
Vulnerability protection, 30
costs related to data use interferes with privacy, 37–39
differences to informational perspectives, 33–35
privacy as, 31–42
scope and limits of privacy in context of commercial data exploitation, 35–37
social amplification and catastrophic outcomes, 41
uncertainty, 41–42
Wealth management products, 197
WeBank, 194–195
Wholesale displacement ratio, 175
Market effects
, 132–137
Market efficiency in 10B-5 litigation
, 83–85
efficiency properties in securities fraud litigation
, 93–97
formal characterization of efficiency properties
, 98–104
informational vs. valuation efficiency
, 91–92
properties of efficient markets
, 86–91
Market prices
, 89–90
Materiality
, 86–87
“Maximum privacy” policy
, 46
Myopic consumers
, 4–5
market for data
, 9–15
market regulation
, 15–22
model
, 6–8
no market for data
, 8–9
Negative liberty
, 38
Non-exclusionary price floors
assumptions, definitions, and notation
, 174–175
downstream price floor protects against vertical price squeeze
, 175
policy implications
, 178–181
two-sided safe harbor
, 176–178
upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination
, 175–176
Noncompliance
, 110
Nonforecastability
, 90
Nonperforming loans (NPL)
, 191–192
Optimization of trade-offs, 43–52
P2P lending, 195–196
Patent Act, 60
Patent Examination Data System (PEDS), 62–63
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 68–69
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 61–62
Patent(s), 2
claim, 60
eligibility, 60–63
legislation, 60
policy, 66
Patentable subject matter, 60–61
Pattern day trader, 97
Penalty, 110
multiplier, 112, 115–116
regime, 114
Permitted noncompliance, 111
Personal data, 30
use of, 30
Personal Data Protection Bill (PDP Bill 2019), 31, 2019
Price discrimination, 5, 7–8
Price squeeze, 172, 175
Price-floor constraints (P-F constraints), 172
Privacy, 1–2, 4, 30–31, 43, 52, 109
regulation, 6
self-management, 49–50
as vulnerability protection, 31–42
Private banks, 193–195
Purpose limitation, 50
Puzzles, 190
Regulated parties, 117
Regulation, 4
Regulators, 109, 111
Reliance, 84
Retail displacement ratio, 175
Right to be forgotten, 4–5, 16, 19
Right to be informed, 4–5, 15–16
Right to erasure. See Right to be forgotten
Risk, 32
of harm, 43–52
Risk-neutral probability
derivation of, 103–104
function, 104
“Risk-neutral” distribution, 103
Rules and standards, 111, 113, 115–116
Ruling out securities price forecastability, 100–104
Sabotage, 172
Safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Samuelson’s nonforecastability theorem, 100–101
Securities fraud litigation, 2
current practice in, 93–94
efficiency properties in, 93–97
extensive informational efficiency, 95–96
market prices, 96
plaintiff believes market prices, 96–97
violations of law of one price, 94–95
Securities law, 190
Security price movements, 86–88
Shadow-banking, forms of, 196–197
Sherman Act, 172
Social norms, 116
Sophisticated consumer, 4–6
State’s governance model, 190
Substantial authority, 114
Supreme Court, 61
Surplus, 4–5
Time-consistent decisions, 8
Traditional banks, 196
Trinko
, 173
Two-part test, 61–62
Two-period model, 6
Two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Uncertainty, 41–42, 62
patenting under, 62–65
score, 74–81
Undercompliance, 111
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 62–63
Upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
upstream P-F constraint, 176
Valuation efficiency, 90–92
Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs), 178, 180–181
Vertical mergers, 180
Vertically integrated firm (VIF), 172–173
Vulnerability protection, 30
costs related to data use interferes with privacy, 37–39
differences to informational perspectives, 33–35
privacy as, 31–42
scope and limits of privacy in context of commercial data exploitation, 35–37
social amplification and catastrophic outcomes, 41
uncertainty, 41–42
Wealth management products, 197
WeBank, 194–195
Wholesale displacement ratio, 175
Optimization of trade-offs
, 43–52
P2P lending
, 195–196
Patent Act
, 60
Patent Examination Data System (PEDS)
, 62–63
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance
, 68–69
Patent Trial and Appeal Board
, 61–62
Patent(s)
, 2
claim
, 60
eligibility
, 60–63
legislation
, 60
policy
, 66
Patentable subject matter
, 60–61
Pattern day trader
, 97
Penalty
, 110
multiplier
, 112, 115–116
regime
, 114
Permitted noncompliance
, 111
Personal data
, 30
use of
, 30
Personal Data Protection Bill (PDP Bill 2019)
, 31, 2019
Price discrimination
, 5, 7–8
Price squeeze
, 172, 175
Price-floor constraints (P-F constraints)
, 172
Privacy
, 1–2, 4, 30–31, 43, 52, 109
regulation
, 6
self-management
, 49–50
as vulnerability protection
, 31–42
Private banks
, 193–195
Purpose limitation
, 50
Puzzles
, 190
Regulated parties, 117
Regulation, 4
Regulators, 109, 111
Reliance, 84
Retail displacement ratio, 175
Right to be forgotten, 4–5, 16, 19
Right to be informed, 4–5, 15–16
Right to erasure. See Right to be forgotten
Risk, 32
of harm, 43–52
Risk-neutral probability
derivation of, 103–104
function, 104
“Risk-neutral” distribution, 103
Rules and standards, 111, 113, 115–116
Ruling out securities price forecastability, 100–104
Sabotage, 172
Safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Samuelson’s nonforecastability theorem, 100–101
Securities fraud litigation, 2
current practice in, 93–94
efficiency properties in, 93–97
extensive informational efficiency, 95–96
market prices, 96
plaintiff believes market prices, 96–97
violations of law of one price, 94–95
Securities law, 190
Security price movements, 86–88
Shadow-banking, forms of, 196–197
Sherman Act, 172
Social norms, 116
Sophisticated consumer, 4–6
State’s governance model, 190
Substantial authority, 114
Supreme Court, 61
Surplus, 4–5
Time-consistent decisions, 8
Traditional banks, 196
Trinko
, 173
Two-part test, 61–62
Two-period model, 6
Two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Uncertainty, 41–42, 62
patenting under, 62–65
score, 74–81
Undercompliance, 111
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 62–63
Upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
upstream P-F constraint, 176
Valuation efficiency, 90–92
Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs), 178, 180–181
Vertical mergers, 180
Vertically integrated firm (VIF), 172–173
Vulnerability protection, 30
costs related to data use interferes with privacy, 37–39
differences to informational perspectives, 33–35
privacy as, 31–42
scope and limits of privacy in context of commercial data exploitation, 35–37
social amplification and catastrophic outcomes, 41
uncertainty, 41–42
Wealth management products, 197
WeBank, 194–195
Wholesale displacement ratio, 175
Regulated parties
, 117
Regulation
, 4
Regulators
, 109, 111
Reliance
, 84
Retail displacement ratio
, 175
Right to be forgotten
, 4–5, 16, 19
Right to be informed
, 4–5, 15–16
Right to erasure. See Right to be forgotten
Risk
, 32
of harm
, 43–52
Risk-neutral probability
derivation of
, 103–104
function
, 104
“Risk-neutral” distribution
, 103
Rules and standards
, 111, 113, 115–116
Ruling out securities price forecastability
, 100–104
Sabotage
, 172
Safe harbor margin ratios
, 177–178
Samuelson’s nonforecastability theorem
, 100–101
Securities fraud litigation
, 2
current practice in
, 93–94
efficiency properties in
, 93–97
extensive informational efficiency
, 95–96
market prices
, 96
plaintiff believes market prices
, 96–97
violations of law of one price
, 94–95
Securities law
, 190
Security price movements
, 86–88
Shadow-banking, forms of
, 196–197
Sherman Act
, 172
Social norms
, 116
Sophisticated consumer
, 4–6
State’s governance model
, 190
Substantial authority
, 114
Supreme Court
, 61
Surplus
, 4–5
Time-consistent decisions, 8
Traditional banks, 196
Trinko
, 173
Two-part test, 61–62
Two-period model, 6
Two-sided safe harbor, 176–178
safe harbor margin ratios, 177–178
Uncertainty, 41–42, 62
patenting under, 62–65
score, 74–81
Undercompliance, 111
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 62–63
Upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination, 175–176
upstream P-F constraint, 176
Valuation efficiency, 90–92
Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs), 178, 180–181
Vertical mergers, 180
Vertically integrated firm (VIF), 172–173
Vulnerability protection, 30
costs related to data use interferes with privacy, 37–39
differences to informational perspectives, 33–35
privacy as, 31–42
scope and limits of privacy in context of commercial data exploitation, 35–37
social amplification and catastrophic outcomes, 41
uncertainty, 41–42
Wealth management products, 197
WeBank, 194–195
Wholesale displacement ratio, 175
Time-consistent decisions
, 8
Traditional banks
, 196
Trinko
, 173
Two-part test
, 61–62
Two-period model
, 6
Two-sided safe harbor
, 176–178
safe harbor margin ratios
, 177–178
Uncertainty
, 41–42, 62
patenting under
, 62–65
score
, 74–81
Undercompliance
, 111
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
, 62–63
Upstream price floor protects against nonprice discrimination
, 175–176
upstream P-F constraint
, 176
Valuation efficiency, 90–92
Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs), 178, 180–181
Vertical mergers, 180
Vertically integrated firm (VIF), 172–173
Vulnerability protection, 30
costs related to data use interferes with privacy, 37–39
differences to informational perspectives, 33–35
privacy as, 31–42
scope and limits of privacy in context of commercial data exploitation, 35–37
social amplification and catastrophic outcomes, 41
uncertainty, 41–42
Wealth management products, 197
WeBank, 194–195
Wholesale displacement ratio, 175
Valuation efficiency
, 90–92
Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs)
, 178, 180–181
Vertical mergers
, 180
Vertically integrated firm (VIF)
, 172–173
Vulnerability protection
, 30
costs related to data use interferes with privacy
, 37–39
differences to informational perspectives
, 33–35
privacy as
, 31–42
scope and limits of privacy in context of commercial data exploitation
, 35–37
social amplification and catastrophic outcomes
, 41
uncertainty
, 41–42
Wealth management products
, 197
WeBank
, 194–195
Wholesale displacement ratio
, 175
- Prelims
- The Law and Economics of Privacy, Personal Data, Artificial Intelligence, and Incomplete Monitoring
- The Right to Be Informed and the Right to Be Forgotten. Welfare Implications in Presence of Myopic Consumers
- Privacy as Vulnerability Protection: Optimizing Trade-Offs with Opportunities to Gain Knowledge
- Innovating under Uncertainty: The Patent-Eligibility of Artificial Intelligence after Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International
- Market Efficiency and Securities Fraud Litigation
- Legal Standards and Incomplete Monitoring
- The Law and Economics of Nonexclusionary Price Floors
- Lending in China
- Index