Does CEO compensation suppress employee wages?

Abstract

Purpose

This study aims to examine the impact of CEO equity-based compensation (EBC) on employee wages. It also examines the impact of EBC on average employee wages in different industries and business cycles.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors use pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) to measure for CEO EBC and run OLS models with year and industry dummies. As many firms do not report labor expenses, the authors conduct the two-step analysis as in Heckman (1979) to overcome the potential selection bias.

Findings

The authors find that CEOs with higher EBC tend to pay their employees lower wages. They also find that such an impact is more evident in non-technology firms than in technology firms. Finally, they find that CEOs with higher PPS are more likely to depress employee wages when the business cycle shows a downturn.

Originality/value

No study examines the impact of EBC on employee wages directly to date. The authors add to the existing stream of literature regarding employee wages and managerial compensation. Hence, they purport that the findings support existing literature suggesting EBC contributes to, rather than alleviates, the classic agency conflict. Finally, the evidence suggests an unexplored manifestation of that agency conflict and an additional source of CEO rent extraction.

Citation

Graefe-Anderson, R., Pyo, U. and Zhu, B. (2018), "Does CEO compensation suppress employee wages?", Review of Accounting and Finance, Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 426-452. https://doi.org/10.1108/RAF-04-2017-0065