The optimal operation decision of gas station considering charging pile installation – conflict and coordination

Abstract

Purpose

In the construction of charging piles, traditional gas stations possess significant advantages in terms of regional and financial resources. The transformation of gas stations into “refueling+charging” integrated gas stations relies on charging pile manufacturers and government, involving coordination issues with them. This paper aims to propose a joint coordination contract based on the principles of cost-sharing and revenue-sharing. The objective is to achieve systemic coordination among integrated gas stations, charging pile manufacturers, and the government, optimizing the planning of the quantity of charging piles and charging prices.

Design/methodology/approach

We have constructed an operational system model based on the Stackelberg game between charging pile manufacturers, integrated gas stations, and government. We have analyzed the optimal quantity of charging piles and charging prices under the impact of government subsidy policies in both decentralized and centralized operation scenarios. Additionally, we have proposed a joint coordination contract based on cost-sharing and revenue-sharing to coordinate this tripartite operational system.

Findings

The study reveals that, under simple cooperative contracts, the optimal decision does not yield maximum profits for the operational system due to the “double-marginal effect”. However, under the impact of the joint coordination contract, which combines cost-sharing and revenue-sharing as proposed in this paper, gas stations will consider the charging pile manufacturer’s costs and government subsidies when determining the optimal quantity and price. This not only achieves system coordination but also results in Pareto improvement in the benefits of all system members by adjusting contract parameters.

Originality/value

The value of this research lies in its insights into operational strategies for the construction of charging piles for electric vehicles. By analyzing optimal decisions under different contract arrangements, the study provides guidance to relevant stakeholders, enabling the operational system to achieve greater efficiency and coordination and realize more extensive Pareto improvements. Furthermore, it extends the application of coordination contract theory in the context of charging pile construction and operations.

Citation

Jiang, M., Jiang, M., Xue, J., Zhan, W. and Liu, Y. (2024), "The optimal operation decision of gas station considering charging pile installation – conflict and coordination", Kybernetes, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. https://doi.org/10.1108/K-11-2023-2309