Evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders under the whole process trusteeship mode of agricultural production

Abstract

Purpose

China's agricultural production trusteeship is characterized by the organic link between household operation of small-scale peasant economy and agricultural socialized services, which releases agricultural development vitality and promotes agricultural modernization. As one of the agricultural production trusteeship modes, the whole process trusteeship is suitable for the actual situation of China's aging population and labor force transfer. This paper aims to construct an evolutionary game model containing multistakeholder to explore the behavior decisions through numerical simulation and to provide useful suggestions for the formation of a positive and stable trusteeship relationship and the sound development of the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper incorporates village committees, service organizations and farmers into the same research framework, selects “guarantee + dividends” as the income distribution method and applies the evolutionary game method to analyze behavioral choices and evolutionary paths of stakeholders. By constructing the expectation function, establishing the replicator dynamic equations and analyzing the tripartite evolutionary stability strategy, the authors explore the factors that affect the stakeholders’ strategy choice and determine asymptotically stable points and stability conditions.

Findings

(1) There is a game relationship among village committees, farmers and service organizations in the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production, asymptotically stable points (0,0,1) and (1,1,1) are obtained through calculation. (2) The proportion of stakeholders' strategy choice, the weight of the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production in the performance appraisal of the village committee, the village committee's supervision cost, the village committee's reputation effect and the penalty for false dividends of the service organization will affect the speed at which the curve representing the tripartite relationship approaches two asymptotically stable points.

Research limitations/implications

The countermeasures proposed in the paper have excellent reference value. (1) For areas that have realized the project: Village committees can solve the trusteeship problems exposed in the initial areas and improve farmers' satisfaction with the project. (2) For areas that have not realized the project: Those regions will receive more experience references and enhance their confidence in this project. The limitation of the paper is that it takes the main grain-producing areas in only the three northeastern provinces of China as the research object. The next research object will be extended to the whole country.

Practical implications

This paper propose strategies for realizing the orderly operation of the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production: first, increase the proportion of stakeholders' strategy choices; second, reduce the village committee's supervision cost; third, increase the weight of the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production in the performance appraisal of the village committee; fourth, improve the village committee's reputation effect; fifth, increase the penalty for false dividends of the service organization.

Originality/value

Agricultural production trusteeship is in its initial stage in China. The interest relationships between stakeholders are not yet clear. The paper innovatively applies the evolutionary game method to the research field of the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production. According to conditions in China, based on ensuring the guaranteed income, the paper introduces the dividend income variable and establishes a tripartite game model of village committees, service organization and farmers. The paper provides suggestions for the orderly and healthy development of China's agricultural production trusteeship and provides experience for the operation of other modes of agricultural production trusteeship.

Citation

Ma, L., Wang, Y. and Teng, Y. (2022), "Evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders under the whole process trusteeship mode of agricultural production", Kybernetes, Vol. 51 No. 10, pp. 2877-2901. https://doi.org/10.1108/K-01-2021-0068