International trade protectionist policies and in-state preferences: A link

Abstract

By implementing various forms of preference policies, countries around the world intervene in their economies for their own political and economic purposes. Likewise, twenty-five states in the U.S. have implemented in-state preference policies (NASPO, 2012) to protect and support their own vendors from out-of-state competition to achieve similar purposes. The purpose of this paper is to show the connection between protectionist public policy instruments noted in the international trade literature and the in-state preference policies within the United States. This paper argues that the reasons and the rationales for adopting these preference policies in international trade and the states' contexts are similar. Given the similarity in policy outcomes, the paper further argues that the international trade literature provides an overarching explanation to help understand what states could expect in applying in-state preference policies.

Citation

Abutabenjeh, S., Gordon, S.B. and Mengistu, B. (2017), "International trade protectionist policies and in-state preferences: A link", Journal of Public Procurement, Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 31-52. https://doi.org/10.1108/JOPP-17-01-2017-B002