Auditor’s response to firm’s environmental violations and engagement in supplemental environmental projects

Abstract

Purpose

In this study, the authors investigate a pressing concern: how auditors react to their clients facing repercussions due to environmental violations. More specifically, this study aims to examine how environmental engagements, which carry potential risks and liabilities, influence auditors’ decision-making and fee structure.

Design/methodology/approach

This study uses unique, reliable and actual violation data from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US-EPA) from 2000 to 2015, focusing on clients involved in environmental violations that led to legal prosecution and penalties and those who subsequently engaged in voluntary supplemental environmental projects (SEPs). The authors use the ordinary least squares method to test the authors’ main research question and later use propensity score matching and alternate data source (ASSET4) to check the robustness of the authors’ results.

Findings

The authors find that firms with environmental violations are more susceptible to auditor resignation. Moreover, the environmental violator firms that maintain their engagement with auditors pay significantly higher audit fees compared to non-environmental violator firms. Furthermore, these environmental violator firms also face extended audit report delays and take longer to appoint a new auditor.

Originality/value

This study provides an additional consequence of environmental violations, namely, increased chances of auditor resignation and higher audit fees, alongside the penalties imposed by the US-EPA. Moreover, the authors’ findings position environmental violations and participation in SEPs as important factors in auditors’ business risk assessment.

Citation

Ahmed, A. and Hussain, A. (2024), "Auditor’s response to firm’s environmental violations and engagement in supplemental environmental projects", Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. https://doi.org/10.1108/JFRA-12-2023-0739