To read this content please select one of the options below:

The power of oversight: institutional investors as moderators of the earnings quality-information asymmetry nexus in Europe

Yasser Eliwa (College of Interdisciplinary Studies, Zayed University, Abu Dhabi, UAE and Loughborough Business School, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK)
Jim Haslam (Durham University Business School, Durham, UK and School of Business, The University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan)
Santhosh Abraham (McAfee School of Business, Union University, Jackson, Tennessee, USA)
Ahmed Saleh (Brunel Business School, Brunel University London, London, UK and Faculty of Commerce, Mansoura University, Mansoura, Egypt)

International Journal of Accounting & Information Management

ISSN: 1834-7649

Article publication date: 6 November 2024

Issue publication date: 21 January 2025

112

Abstract

Purpose

While there is some evidence of a relationship between earnings quality and information asymmetry, there is limited evidence on the moderating role of institutional investors in this relationship. To fill this gap, this study aims to examine how institutional ownership affects the relationship between earnings quality and information asymmetry, with a focus on the impact of different investment horizons.

Design/methodology/approach

This study uses a sample of listed European firms from 2000 to 2022. Earnings quality is measured using the McNichols (2002) modification of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The analysis examines the moderating effect of institutional ownership on the relationship between earnings quality and information asymmetry.

Findings

This study finds that the relationship between earnings quality and information asymmetry is more pronounced in firms with a higher percentage of institutional ownership. This study finds that the monitoring role of long-term institutional investors is more effective than that of short-term institutional investors. This study also finds that the influence of institutional investors is more significant in firms with incentives to engage in earnings management.

Practical implications

The findings provide evidence suggesting that institutional investors are an important class of investors in terms of exercising an effective monitoring role to mitigate information asymmetry and demand higher earnings quality from their investee firms. These findings are informative for many financial reporting participants, including investors, analysts, regulators and managers.

Originality/value

This study extends the existing research examining the relationship between earnings quality and information asymmetry (e.g. Affleck-Graves et al., 2002; Ascioglu et al., 2012; Bhattacharya et al., 2013; Jayaraman, 2008; Liu and Elayan, 2015) by examining the moderating effect of institutional ownership on this relationship. It further contributes to the literature by distinguishing between long- and short-term institutional investors and their respective monitoring roles. In addition, this study broadens the geographical scope of the research by using cross-country data from European firms, providing evidence that country-specific factors do not uniformly affect the relationship between earnings quality and information asymmetry.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful for comments of the EAA Annual Congress and the BAFA Annual Conference. Any remaining errors are the authors’ own.

Conflict of interest: The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Citation

Eliwa, Y., Haslam, J., Abraham, S. and Saleh, A. (2025), "The power of oversight: institutional investors as moderators of the earnings quality-information asymmetry nexus in Europe", International Journal of Accounting & Information Management, Vol. 33 No. 1, pp. 68-103. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJAIM-01-2024-0029

Publisher

:

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2024, Emerald Publishing Limited

Related articles