For a bright future. Cuban nuclear engineers studying in late socialist Hungary

Abstract

Purpose

This research aims to contribute to History of Education Studies as well as to New Cold War Studies, by examining a Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer program, launched in Hungary three times in the 1980s for Cuban nuclear engineers, graduates of the University of Havana.

Design/methodology/approach

The institutional setting, the content of the program, the teaching staff, the students, and the outcomes are studied. The factors that motivated the birth of this special program are examined, including the following areas; in what ways it was different from the courses in which foreign students participated in Hungary; what its strengths and weaknesses were; how we can learn from this past experience and what relevance it has for the present.

Findings

The analysis – carried out within the context of Cuban–Hungarian relations in the Cold War – demonstrates that these two satellite countries used the fields of science and education to widen their international possibilities and at the same time to reinforce their national interests by cooperating with each other.

Originality/value

The investigation is based on archival sources, university yearbooks and journals as well as contemporary Hungarian press. Written sources were complemented by interviews with Cuban students and Hungarian teaching staff, thus providing a personal perspective, balancing official views.

Citation

Szente-Varga, M. (2024), "For a bright future. Cuban nuclear engineers studying in late socialist Hungary", History of Education Review, Vol. 53 No. 1, pp. 28-44. https://doi.org/10.1108/HER-08-2023-0018

Introduction

In summer 1983, half a dozen highly talented and carefully selected Cuban students, recently graduated from the University of Havana, arrived in Budapest in order to continue their studies in Hungary, first doing a one-year language course and then a two-year Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer master program (in Hungarian!). At that time, 8,500 Cubans studied in foreign universities, 120 of them in Hungary (Iglói Nagy, 1983, p. 28) [1]. Most of these students were undergraduates, undertaking BA or BSc programs abroad. The master program [2] launched by the Budapest University of Technology (Budapesti Műszaki Egyetem, BME, now called Budapest University of Technology and Economics) was exceptional for its postgraduate level, limited number of students and also because it was specially geared for Cubans while also taking into account Hungarian needs. Therefore, it targeted a mixed group: first of all, outstanding Cuban graduates who came to further their education with the aim of either teaching future nuclear scientists on the island or working as researchers, and on the other hand, Hungarian specialists in need of more theoretical knowledge, who already had a job in the first, brand-new nuclear power plant in the country, just over 100 km south of the capital city, in Paks. The first reactor at the Paks nuclear power plant started to operate in 1983, the same year that construction in Juraguá, Cuba, began on what was planned to be the first nuclear reactor on the island.

This essay will first explore the wider, international framework of this master program, closely connected to the hegemonic (but not necessarily monopolistic) role the Soviet Union wanted to ensure for itself via the Comecon in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, whether via bilateral agreements or in a multilateral way. This left some room for manoeuvre and opportunities for satellite countries such as Hungary and Cuba. Hungary developed a good reputation in nuclear science and served as an example for Cuba in certain ways. Our starting point is that Hungary’s main attraction included its scientific and educational achievements; a successful nuclear power plant construction project while being a country of similar size and population compared to Cuba; and Hungary’s position as a satellite to the Soviet Union, a role that Cuba also shared, together with its challenges, limitations and possibilities.

The aim of this research is to contribute to History of Education Studies as well as to New Cold War Studies. After explaining the general, conceptual and international background, the focus will be narrowed down onto the MSc program and its immediate context: the institutional setting, the content of the program, the teaching staff, the students and the results. Potential good practices will be focused on at the end of the article.

The investigation is based on selected, cross-checked and analysed data from papers of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs retained in the Hungarian National Archive (Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára, MNL OL), documents of the Budapest University of Technology (yearbooks, University Council meetings, Rector’s Council meetings, university journals) and contemporary press. Written sources were complemented by oral ones in the form of interviews conducted with Cuban students and Hungarian teaching staff, thus providing personal insights also.

International context

Early Cold War Studies divided the world into two antagonistic and separate parts, the West and the East, offering on one hand a little nuanced view of the differences within one bloc, and, on the other hand, paying little attention to the process of decolonization and thus to a growing number of countries which did not necessarily belong to either of the two camps. The newly independent states of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, together with Latin America, which had mostly obtained its independence earlier, in the first decades of the 19th century but showed similarities in dependency, marginalization and colonial past, came to be known as the Third World (Dragostinova, 2018, p. 666; Westad, 2007, pp. 2–4). These countries, nowadays often referred to by the generic term the Global South, developed their own international links. They played an important role in the foreign relations of the socialist countries and these links demonstrate in turn that the isolation of the socialist bloc was only partial.

The growth and diversification in the international relations of the Soviet Union became visible after the death of Stalin in 1953, but probably started earlier, triggered by the nonviability of the war economy bent on autarchy (Békés, 2021, p. 19) as well as due to “radical global reorderings of decolonization” (Sanchez-Sibony, 2014, p. 11). Following suit, socialist countries also diversified their links, with the exception of Hungary, which because of the crushing of the 1956 Revolution became internationally isolated and could therefore begin intensifying its foreign contacts only from the beginning of the 1960s, in great part with the goal – but not necessarily with the result – of obtaining hard currency (Horváth, 2022, pp. 17–18). The Soviet Union supported these attempts for a variety of reasons: increased revenues via trade could contribute to inner stability in these states; socialism and socialist ideas could become more popular in the Third World, where having a Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, etc. presence would mean more visibility not only for those particular countries but also for the socialist bloc in general and its leader, the Soviet Union. For the satellite states, having these contacts was crucial due to their dual dependency (Böröcz, 1992): they depended on the hegemonic power of the Soviet bloc, and at the same time they also depended on the West for technology transfer and loans (Bódy, 2021, p. 5; Ginelli, 2018). The socialist bloc needed contacts with the West, however, these links were necessarily limited for ideological reasons. Connections with the Global South were to compensate for this deficiency, but they could only partially replace missing contacts (Tomka, 2023, p. 233). Instead of a dual dependency, Csaba Békés writes about a “tripartite determinism” of Hungarian foreign policy, adding “all-Eastern European lobbying effort” as a new dimension, that is the competition among European socialist countries themselves for representing their interests and gaining more room for manoeuvre (Békés, 2021, p. 29).

The above-mentioned East–South ties and connections make it evident that socialist countries were not isolated during the Cold War, and they were already participating in globalization much earlier than the 1989/1990 regime change (Bódy, 2021, p. 6). Their connectivities had particular characteristics and have therefore been called red globalization (Sanchez-Sibony, 2014), socialist globalization (Bockman, 2015; Mark and Betts, 2022) and/or alternative globalization (Mark et al., 2020). However, taking into account that the socialist world depended on the West, Béla Tomka argues that alternative globalization might not be the most appropriate term since socialist globalization alone was not viable. Possibly, a better solution is to use limited globalization (Tomka, 2022), in the sense that the (political) East developed intensive links with the Global South whereas interactions with the West were restricted.

Although socialist countries enjoyed certain freedom in their international connectivities, these took place under the watchful eye of the Soviet Union and although they could provide them with some more room for political manoeuvres and extra revenue, this did not change their basic position in the international constellation. They remained satellites. In case of exceeding the limits, the Soviet Union would intervene militarily, just as it did in Hungary in 1956 and – via the Warsaw Pact – in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Therefore, the concept of satellite states will be used throughout the essay, and not partners (Bain, 2001) or junior allies (Smith, 2000). Yet it is important to underline that “satellite” does not mean passivity. Within the given international coordinates of the Cold War, these countries cooperated, or even competed with each other, based on their interests, and tried to form entanglements with the rest of the world, in particular the Global South, in fields such as trade, culture, science, education, etc. These ties entailed mobility. Investigations into student mobility and education tend to be recent but show a growing trend (Apor, 2022, 2023; Berg, 2015; Burton, 2019; Katsakioris, 2021; Müller, 2014). This essay aims to contribute to this field by demonstrating how Cuba and Hungary tried to promote their interests in and with the help of nuclear science, with a particular focus on higher education, a “key battlefield” of the Cold War (Altbach, 2007, p. 6).

Significance of Cuba

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the victory of the Sandinista forces in Nicaragua in 1979, the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, soon followed by a more anti-Communist and more global US foreign policy (Bain, 2001, p. 48) worsened relations between the two superpowers and at the same time increased the importance of Latin America for the Soviets. The region had geostrategic importance. It was not so attractive in itself from a Soviet perspective but gained importance because of its proximity to the United States and because the US had vital interests there. Consequently, the worse US–Soviet relations got, the more significant Latin America became for the Soviet Union (Rouvinski, 2017). Supporting socialist Cuba and having a Soviet presence on the island, could on one hand make the Soviet Union more visible on the international scene and underline its position as a superpower, and on the other hand, it could irritate the US and distract it from issues that were fundamental for the Soviets (see Evanson, 1986; Desjeans and Clement, 1987; Mujal-León, 1989; Rouvinski and Jeifets, 2022; Szente-Varga, 2022). This international constellation, coupled with the desire of Moscow to reduce its crude oil exports to socialist countries from the mid-1970s in order to be able to export more to the West and obtain hard currency (Elliot and Cook, 2004, p. 376; Gustafson, 2014, p. 274; Szabo and Deak, 2020, pp. 63–96), gave a boost to the Cuban nuclear program. The Prague Comecon [3] Summit in 1980 adopted the “Plan for the accelerated development of science and technology of the republic of Cuba until 1990”. This ten-year plan consisted of various fields, of which nuclear energy (subprogram number 12), was assigned to Hungary (MNL OL, 1986).

Cuban nuclear plans had long antecedents and reach back to the time of Fulgencio Batista. For the Castro government, the major aims included reducing dependency on Soviet crude oil imports and on the Soviet Union in general; trimming down, to a certain extent, the negative impacts of the US embargo (Benjamin-Alvarado, 1998, p. 15); boosting “techno-material development” of the island (Cederlöf, 2020, p. 14); increasing the legitimacy of the government by a “shining example of success” (Benjamin-Alvarado, 2000, p. 1) as well as enhancing Cuba’s international prestige. Cuba signed a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union on nuclear matters in 1967 (on the construction of a research reactor) and nine years later (on the construction of energy-producing nuclear reactors) (Benjamin-Alvarado and Belkin, 1994, pp. 18–20). In 1976, when the latter document was signed, there was only one nuclear power plant functioning in all of Latin America: Atucha 1 in Argentina. Constructions had already begun on power plants Embalse (Argentina, 1974–) as well as Angra 1 (Brazil, 1971–), and in the year 1976 works started on Angra 2 (Brazil) and Laguna Verde 1 (Mexico) (World Nuclear Association, 2023). Cuba could have joined this prestigious group, yet constructions on the island were slow to materialize, and finally started in 1983 in the case of the first reactor (Pérez-López, 1987, p. 80), already at a time of worsening East–West relations characterizing the “Little Cold War”.

Growing international tensions made it increasingly important for the Soviet Union to keep countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, etc., in its “exterior imperial periphery” (Békés, 2012, p. 303). To this end, Moscow shared burdens, using both its own resources and those of its satellites. Hungary was drawn into the Cuban nuclear project – with the Soviet Union retaining the upper hand.

Soon after the Prague Comecon Summit of 1980, a new Cuban–Soviet nuclear agreement was signed in 1981, this time on the construction of a nuclear research centre on the island. It was, however, basically the building that the Soviets would provide. The research reactor inside the building complex was a task for Hungary. The Hungarian–Cuban agreement between the two governments was signed in February 1982, and between the respective atomic energy commissions (Magyar Népköztársaság Országos Atomenergia Bizottsága and Comisión de Energía Atómica de la República de Cuba) in March 1983. A month later, a related bilateral Hungarian–Soviet agreement completed the formal underpinnings of the cooperation (MNL OL, 1986) [4].

The attraction of Hungary

Hungary had a good reputation in nuclear science, being the birthplace of some of the pioneers in this scientific discipline, such as Leó Szilárd and Ede Teller, and also the home of the internationally renowned Central Research Institute for Physics (Központi Fizikai Kutató Intézet, KFKI), founded in 1950 (Jéki, 2006, pp. 79–84). By 1960, Hungarian scientists had built the first zero-power research reactor in the building complex of the KFKI in Csillebérc, Budapest, operating at 10 megawatts. This ZR-1 model was followed by increasingly sophisticated ones (ZR-2 in 1962, ZR-3 in 1965, ZR-4 in 1966 and ZR-5 in 1970), until reaching the ZR-6 model in 1972, developed to help the design of VVER nuclear power plants (Csom, 2002). In 1971, the Comecon Standing Commission on the Peaceful Uses of the Atom decided to establish an international research group to carry out investigations with the research reactor at KFKI (Veszprémi Napló, 1971, p. 1). Experts from seven Comecon countries immediately joined the group, formed in 1972 and headed by Prof. Dr Zoltán Szatmáry, whereas scientists from Finland (not a Comecon member) as well as Cuba and Vietnam, which adhered to Comecon in the 1970s (Cuba in 1972 and Vietnam in 1978), joined later.

Cuban investigators had made visits to the KFKI in the 1970s, even before joining the Comecon international project. The number of research days Cubans spent at the institute was low in the first half of the 1970s but started to grow from the second half of the decade, showing a concentration in 1979 and 1980 (Table 1).

Not only did the number of visiting researchers tend to grow but also the time they spent in KFKI, in various cases the time span amounting to 90–180 days. Unfortunately, no such data are available for the 1980s, as the bulletin KFKI Tájékoztató was discontinued. The initial year of growth (1976) corresponds to the date when the Soviet–Cuban agreement was signed on the construction of nuclear power reactors on the island.

The nuclear option could be attractive for its high international visibility and prestige, yet it required niche technology and specialized scientific knowledge. The fact that in Hungary – a country of similar size and population to those of Cuba – a nuclear power plant of four reactors was successfully completed, was motivating for the Cuban leadership, demonstrating that this kind of development was viable (Interview, student, 2022). Cuban interest is also manifest by the fact that from the 1970s – that is the beginning of the works on the nuclear power plant in Hungary – Cuban visits became recurrent at the construction site in Paks (Atomerőmű, 1979, p. 4; Tolna Megyei Népújság, 1981, p. 3; Tolna Megyei Népújság, 1984, p. 1.). The first nuclear reactor started to operate in Hungary in 1983, soon to be followed by other reactors in 1984, 1986 and 1987, all located in the Danube-side town of Paks. Construction in Juraguá, Cuba, began in 1983 on what was planned to be the first nuclear reactor on the island, and in 1985, on the second reactor (Castro Díaz-Balart, 1990, p. 49).

While the Soviet Union was to provide Cuba with energy-generating nuclear power reactors and a building for the island’s nuclear investigation complex, it was Hungary’s task to build the zero-power reactor of the research complex and install it in Cuba as well as to train professionals who would carry out investigations with the ZR reactor in the above-mentioned scientific establishment. This takes us directly to the MSc program launched at the Budapest University of Technology in September 1984.

The MSc program and the institutional background

Higher education related to the nuclear field was shared in Hungary, including the Budapest University of Technology, ELTE University (also in the capital), and two higher education institutions in provincial capitals, the Kossuth Lajos University of Science in Debrecen and the Veszprém University of Chemical Engineering in Veszprém, each having its own specificities. A peculiar feature and asset for the education at BME was the nuclear training reactor of the university built for educational purposes and operating since 1971.

With the declared goal of “providing further training in reactor physics and reactor engineering for seven young Cuban professionals who had obtained their degrees in nuclear engineering at the University of Havana” (University Council Meeting, 1984), the Cuban Atomic Energy Commission and the Hungarian Ministry of Culture (Művelődési Minisztérium) initiated the launch of a Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer program at BME. The university had had experience in these types of courses but this one was geared for special Cuban needs, taking into account the nuclear research reactor and the energy-producing nuclear reactor to be built on the island.

According to the University Council meeting at BME in March 1984, “The educational objective of the Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer course is to deepen the knowledge of students […] mainly in the physical, thermal, thermohydraulic, technical, technological, application and operational aspects of research reactors and, to a lesser extent, of power generating reactors. Graduates will be able to participate in a creative way in the physical calculations and design of research reactors, in radiation protection calculations related to reactors, in the operation of reactors, in the design of experiments in reactors, in the conduct and evaluation of experiments. To achieve these objectives, students will acquire, in addition to theoretical training, significant practical skills through a large number of laboratory measurements with state-of-the-art equipment” (University Council Meeting, 1984).

It was a two-year course which at the beginning was contemplated as a unique and one-time opportunity, yet in the end it had three editions altogether: the first began in 1984, the second in 1986 and the third and last one in 1988. Even before starting the first edition of the program, the University leadership was considering the possibility of including local students. It was stated in the above-mentioned meeting in spring 1984 that Hungarian students should also be able to take part (University Council Meeting, 1984). This was reflected in the flexible nature of the program, which made it possible to satisfy the needs of two different groups of students. Hungarian students were employees of the brand-new Paks nuclear power plant, whose first reactor was completed in 1983. They needed more theoretical knowledge, and they could study only part-time. That is why they assisted in classes scheduled for only one day of the week. Cuban students arrived with the objective of either becoming researchers (working with the research reactor Hungary was to build in Cuba) or university teachers raising future generations of Cuban nuclear scientists. In their case, theoretical and practical aspects had to be combined. Even though the program appeared in the university catalogue as a part-time one, for Cubans it was in fact a full-time study activity. They assisted classes one day a week (together with the Hungarians), plus had laboratory practices at the university training reactor one day a week from the second semester onward and needed to elaborate their own research work every semester on an eligible topic under the supervision of a tutor of their choice. In order to prepare this semester work, they had tasks for the rest of the week, either at the university reactor or at KFKI, depending on where their supervisor worked (Interview, student, 2022; Interview, teacher, 2023) [5].

This Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer program at the start formed part of the educational portfolio of the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering of BME. However, most of the teachers did not work at the Faculty but at the university training reactor, which instead of a faculty, formed part of the so-called central units of the university, supervised by a vice-rector (BME, 1984). A substantial change took place in the structure of the university in the second half of the 1980s, which also affected the Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer master program. Students of the second generation started the program in 1986 and finished in summer 1988. During their studies, the Faculty of Natural and Social Sciences was established in 1987. At the same time, the university training reactor was incorporated into the Institute of Nuclear Techniques, whereas the Institute itself became part of the newly created faculty. This way, most of the teaching staff became members of the Faculty of Natural and Social Sciences and the faculty took over the program. The third edition of this MSc program, starting in September 1988, already belonged to the educational offer of the new faculty. This, in fact, turned out to be the last edition, due to the regime change in Hungary and a spectacular distancing between the Cuban and the Hungarian governments.

The teaching staff consisted of the most outstanding nuclear scientists from Hungary. I would like to highlight two of them: Prof. Dr Gyula Csom and Prof. Dr Zoltán Szatmáry. Csom (1932–2021), upon the commission of Prof. Dr András Lévai, coordinated the planning and construction of the training reactor of the Budapest University of Technology, then became its director. He had this position when the above-mentioned Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer program was launched for the first time, in 1984. He became director of the Institute of Nuclear Techniques in 1987 as well as vice-dean of the new faculty of the university, the Faculty of Natural and Social Sciences (for more details, see Horn, 2009, pp. 39–84). Zoltán Szatmáry (1939–) started working for the Central Research Institute for Physics (KFKI) in 1962 and became Head of the Reactor Physics Department in 1976. For most of the 1980s – the decade that concerns this study – he was vice director of Nuclear Energy Research Institute forming part of KFKI. At times of political regime change in Hungary he temporarily filled the posts of Vice-Director General (1988–89) and General Director of KFKI (1990) and then worked for a decade as the Director of the Institute of Nuclear Techniques at the Budapest University of Technology, between 1993 and 2004, following Gyula Csom. Between 1972 and 1988 Szatmáry headed the Comecon investigations on the ZR-6 research reactor (BME Nukleáris Technikai Intézet, 2023).

Based on the yearbooks of the BME which list all graduates, the first edition of the above-mentioned Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer program was accomplished by seven Cubans, the second by five and the third – obtaining their diplomas in 1990 – by eight (see Table 2).

The selection process in Cuba was based on university records (average of marks obtained during BSc studies), without applying any special or further exam. If found eligible based on their educational achievements, students were offered the possibility to continue their studies in Hungary. As recalled by the ex-participants, it was not obligatory; it was an option that could be accepted or rejected (Interview, student, 2022). All three generations of Cuban students who studied in Budapest were mixed groups of male and female students, the ratio being 5:2; 4:1 and finally 4:4 (male:female). Chosen students received no special preparation on the island (for example language training, course on Hungarian society and culture, etc.). Change was quick: final exams were soon followed by the trip to Budapest where they arrived in August (Interview, student, 2022). Due to the fact that the language of instruction of the MSc program they were going to study was Hungarian, Cuban students had to study first the local language. For that purpose, they studied and were accommodated – four people in one room – at the Hungarian Pre-University Institute for Foreign Students (Nemzetközi Előkészítő Intézet) in Nándorfejérvári út.

The teaching of Hungarian language preparatory courses for foreigners began in Hungary in 1952 (Balassi Education Programs, 2023). Thus, by 1983, with the arrival of the first group of Cuban graduates from the University of Havana, there were more than 30 years of experience in teaching the Hungarian language. The Institute had developed its own Hungarian coursebook and also published since 1973 Intézeti Szemle, an academic and methodological journal. In the buzz of the 1980s, 40–50 different nationalities lived and studied together at the Institute. Those going on to study BA programs were more likely to be located in the Budaörsi úti building, whereas those to be specialized in technical fields and engineering (BSc programs) were to stay at Nándorfejérvári út, including the groups of Cuban students we are analysing.

Despite their outstanding educational achievements at home in Cuba, and the experience and dedication of Hungarian language teachers in Budapest, learning Hungarian – a non-Indo-European language distantly related to Finnish and Estonian – was a difficult challenge to cope with. Cuban nuclear engineers coming to the Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer program had their own study group. They were not mixed with undergraduates, who constituted the great majority of the people at the Hungarian Pre-University Institute for Foreign Students. Language instruction lasted a year: general language classes were provided for half a year in the autumn semester and then in the spring semester general classes were supplemented by specialist language classes, for example maths and physics to learn the necessary vocabulary. Starting university studies was conditional on completing Hungarian language exams (Interview, student, 2022).

The Cuban side kept an intensive contact with the university both before the launch of the new study program and during its early years. Cuban representatives and/or delegations recurrently visited the Budapest University of Technology. Examples include a 1981 visit by a delegation of the Communist Party of Cuba – received by the Rector Dr Károly Polinszky – which consisted of Dr Fernando Rojas, Head of the Higher Education Department of the Scientific, Educational and Cultural Division of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Elvira Martin, Head of the Development Department of the Cuban Ministry of Higher Education, Colonel Fernando Lavin, representative of the Cuban Ministry of Defence and Felix Cordero, representative of the Cuban State Commission for Labour and Social Security (Egyetemi Értesítő, 1981, p. 32). They were followed in 1982 by Jesús Otón, Cuban Deputy Minister of Higher Education (Egyetemi Értesítő, 1982, p. 34); in 1983 by members of the Cuban Ministry of Higher Education: Head of Department José Ramón Gómez Beltrán and two of his colleagues (Egyetemi Értesítő, 1983, p. 14); in 1984 by Arturo Rodríguez [6], Cuban Deputy Minister of Higher Education (Egyetemi Értesítő, 1984, p. 24); and in 1985 by a four-member Cuban higher education delegation led by engineer Miguel Torrez “to study current issues related to the further education of engineers” (Egyetemi Értesítő, 1985, p. 22). The delegation in 1985, just like Arturo Rodríguez a year before, was received by the Rector.

Visits started to be less frequent from the middle of the 1980s. The main reason for this could be the smooth running of the program, but another factor should also be taken into account, as it could have played a part: a growing unease in general Cuban–Hungarian relations. A clear example of this is the termination of the Hungarian–Cuban bilateral labour agreement before expiry, upon Cuban initiative in February 1987. For Hungary, this step was unexpected (MNL OL, 1987). The labour agreement had been signed in April 1980 between the two countries and in August 1980 between Hungarian TESCO (Nemzetközi Műszaki Tudományos Együttműködési Iroda/Technical and Scientific Cooperation Bureau) and Cubatécnica. The first group of Cuban workers arrived in April–June 1981, followed by several others (MNL OL, 1981). A few thousand Cubans worked in Hungary during that decade – the exact number is still to be determined. The majority of these were women, aged 18–26, who came for a four-year term, to be trained and work mainly in the textile industry (Apor, 2017, pp. 38–39; Bortlová-Vondráková and Szente-Varga, 2021). “By the end of 1985, they produced almost 1/4th of the Hungarian yarn output” (MNL OL, 1985). Cuban authorities must have been aware that the sudden termination of the agreement would create problems for Hungary, so the decision to carry it out could also have had the aim of putting some pressure on the Hungarian government. Especially so as the Cuban decision of unilateral withdrawal did not encompass similar agreements made with Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Despite these strains on bilateral relations, the Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer program for Cubans was maintained, and in 1987 the biggest group so far (eight Cuban students) began their studies at the Hungarian Pre-University Institute for Foreign Students to continue a year later at the Budapest University of Technology. By 1988 it was evident that neither the nuclear reactor nor the research reactor would be completed by 1990 in Cuba [7], but the termination of these projects would still be hoped to be soon, generating a need for highly trained specialists.

End of the program

The number of Cubans started to decrease in Hungary from 1988, as no new guest workers arrived. Those who had already begun their 4-year contracts could stay with the goal of completing it. The distance between Budapest and Havana started to grow, as the Cuban leadership did not agree with the changes taking place in Hungary, and in East Europe in general. Both guestworkers and students were called home from Hungary in 1990. By that year, the number of Cuban guestworkers was estimated to be around 800 in the country and that of Cuban university students 70 (Magyar Nemzet, 1990, p. 5; Népszabadság, 1990, p. 4).

The Hungarian press was rather quiet on the issue of Cubans living in Hungary. Finally, on 13 June 1990, the principal daily papers – Népszabadság (central organ of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, MSZMP) and Népszava (central organ of the Hungarian trade unions) – as well as several regional dailies published the same brief article under the title: “Cuban students will be called home”.

News has spread among Cuban students studying in Hungarian higher education institutions that they would need to return home and would no longer be able to continue their studies in Hungary the year to come. Upon asked by the MTI, the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in Budapest declared that they did not wish to refute the news. The students will have to return to Cuba at the end of the school year … (Békés Megyei Népújság, 1990, p. 1).

This news item did not show a good image of the Cuban authorities, as – according to the article – they did not provide such important information on time. Even when rumours spread, they did not react, only later, at the request of the Hungarian news agency (Magyar Távirati Iroda, MTI). This veiled criticism is an indication of deteriorating links, a process which started from the second half of the 1980s, with the Hungarian politicians following the ideas of Gorbachev, whereas the Cuban leadership was doing the opposite with the “rectification of errors” campaign. By 1989 differences were not only evident but seemed irreconcilable. A summary prepared by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs states: “The social, economic and political changes taking place in our country are seen by the Cuban leadership as a restoration of the capitalist system” (MNL OL, 1990a). Considering these changes to be dangerous for Cuba, Havana distanced itself from Hungary. Inter-party relations ceased suddenly when the Hungarian Socialist Workers” Party (MSZMP) – which had been the ruling political force since its creation in 1956 – dissolved itself in October 1989 and the Communist Party of Cuba was reluctant to have links with its moderate successor, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). Not only did inter-party relations break down, but academic and educational cooperation, too. Students were called back to Cuba in order not to be impacted by the breaking down of the socialist system in Hungary.

Other countries in East-Central Europe were also making their political and economic transitions. What Hungary was doing formed part of a larger, regional process, made possible by the Kremlin. Moscow allowed these countries to go their own way (Sinatra Doctrine), leading to the break-up of the socialist bloc, with the goal of saving money and resources, and this way, the Soviet Union. Although Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership in general recognized that it was urgent to transform the Soviet economy, they became increasingly opposed to the ideas of Gorbachev, both with respect to domestic and foreign policy. Gorbachev was considered unfit to lead and was blamed by Havana for the virtual disappearance of the socialist camp (MNL OL, 1990b). With countries turning capitalist, Cuba no longer wanted to maintain close ties, in order to protect its own system and ideological foundations. Cuban students were recalled from the whole of the socialist bloc (MNL OL, 1990c).

Based on the above, one might think that it was only the Cuban side that wanted to end cooperation. The other side of the coin is revealed by a BME document. The possibilities of international cooperation were discussed at the meeting of the Rector’s Council on 16 October 1989. By that time the winds of change were blowing strongly in Eastern Europe. Poland already had a non-Communist government since the summer elections. The 1956 events, officially viewed as a counter-revolution during the Kádár system, were reassessed in Hungary and declared to be a Revolution, a cornerstone of national history; and Imre Nagy – Prime Minister of Hungary in 1956, executed in 1958 and secretly buried as Piroska Borbíró – was rehabilitated and re-buried, accompanied by hundreds of thousands of people. In September, the Hungarian government opened its borders to Austria, demolishing the “iron curtain”, permitting thus the flow of East Germans from Hungary to Austria and eventually to West Germany, thus contributing to the fall of Erich Honecker in GDR. East Germany would collapse shortly after celebrating its 40 years of existence. At the beginning of October – still before the above-mentioned university meeting – the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party dissolved itself. There was optimism and some uncertainty in the air, whether real change – which was not possible in the middle of the 1950s – could be accomplished this time, at the end of the 1980s.

In this atmosphere, the Rector’s Council reviewed the international cooperation of the university with countries of the (diminishing) socialist world. It was proposed to conclude future contracts for 2 years instead of 5 years, as in the case of universities in Western Europe. “The shorter duration allows for the inclusion of new topics and the termination of cooperation that is no longer of interest.” As for Cuba, the proposal elaborated for the meeting declared: “Cooperation with Cuban universities is to be suspended due to high cost” (Rector's Council Meeting, 1989).

Only two days later, on 18 October 1989, Honecker resigned, and in November the Berlin Wall was demolished. At the same time, protests grew in Czechoslovakia and, before the end of the year, Václav Havel became the president of the country (Velvet Revolution). The strive for change also began in Romania, but events turned violent. The end of the Ceauşescu dictatorship was achieved in a bloody struggle. Hungarians spent the Christmas of 1989 worried – many glued to the television watching the revolution in Romania – fearing that violence might spread to Hungary and that change that had already taken place could be reversed. There began a strong focus on Europe and European integration by Hungarian leadership. The importance of Latin America diminished, and the region disappeared from the radar of interest. What is more, in the case of relations that used to be politically/ideologically based, there was even a kind of counter-reaction: not to do what had been “obligatory” in the past. All this had a negative effect on Hungarian–Cuban links, including higher education. Cuban students were able to continue their studies at Hungarian universities until summer 1990 at the latest. Still, this deadline meant that the third generation of Cuban students could complete the Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer program.

Results

It is not possible to fully evaluate how successful the analysed program was. Success is a rather elusive concept, and its “rate” depends heavily on the factors which are used to measure it. It would be logical to examine the professional life of the ex-students, yet this analysis alone might not yield satisfactory results as their career paths were seriously impacted by the fall of the socialist bloc and the end of the Cold War. Therefore, besides future employment, study achievements (university records) at BME are also taken into account.

Despite the Budapest University of Technology being known among its students for its tough exams and the difficulty in obtaining high scores, and also despite the short span of time (one year) Cuban students had to learn Hungarian before starting their MSc classes in the local language, 40%(!) of them completed the Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer program with a diploma with honours. Based upon their results, four out of the seven students from the first generation (who started the MSc program in autumn 1984 and finished in summer 1986) were offered the opportunity to stay a couple of months longer in Hungary, to continue studying and obtain a “kisdoktori”, which can literally be translated as a “small doctorate”, an academic level that existed in the Soviet system, but is no longer used. It is in between an MSc and a PhD. All four of them obtained their kisdoktori in 1986 (Rector's Council Meeting, 1987). Later generations unfortunately lacked this opportunity, although they also produced excellent results. It seems that Cuban authorities were no longer interested in such highly trained professionals; the MSc was enough, upon receiving their diplomas students needed to return home (Interview, student, 2022).

The socialist world – together with its organizations [8] – had crumbled by the end of the 20th century. Cuba faced a critical situation: it lost 75% of import markets and 95% of its export markets (Anderle, 2004, pp. 165–166), whereas “ex”-socialist countries were much less affected by losing Cuban ties. Both the nuclear power plants in Juraguá and the research reactor in the La Quebrada research centre remained unbuilt. Facing a critical economic situation, in 1992 Fidel Castro announced the suspension of the nuclear program (Benjamin-Alvarado and Belkin, 1994, p. 18). All this resulted in a reduced need for nuclear specialists on the island. Nonetheless, many of those who obtained their diplomas at BME could work in their professions. Some adjusted to other, more demanded areas within the nuclear field, such as nuclear medicine, while others have worked for universities and/or international projects and organizations. Some live in Cuba and some abroad (for example in Brazil, Spain and the USA) (Interview, student, 2022).

Lessons from the past: good practices

Although at BME the last Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer MSc program for graduates of the University of Havana finished more than 30 years ago and the ex-students are now around the age of retirement, it is worth having a closer look at the program to identify elements that contributed to student achievement and satisfaction in order to learn from good practices.

Students sent to Hungary to complete the Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer program studied in small groups from the very beginning, at the Hungarian Pre-University Institute for Foreign Students and at the Budapest University of Technology.

There was a possibility to share a dormitory with Hungarians at the university, so a Hungarian and a Cuban student would stay together in a two-bed room. This not only helped Cubans to enhance their knowledge of Hungarian but also improved their integration into the life of the university, of Budapest, and of the country, in general.

Due to the one-year language training and the fact that the Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer program was launched in 1984, 1986 and 1988, different generations of Cuban students overlapped. For example, the first generation had only completed its first year at the university, when the group of the second generation arrived to begin their studies in Hungarian. Although they lived in different places: university students at the university dormitory and students studying Hungarian at the Nándorfejérvári út building of the Hungarian Pre-University Institute for Foreign Students, they were able to have some interactions and share experiences.

There was frequent communication between the Cuban partner and the Budapest University of Technology – especially in the first half of the 1980s, before and at the time of launching the program. Even when the program was running, teachers were open to proposals and initiatives (Interview, student, 2022).

The program had highly selected, excellent students and an extraordinary teaching staff. Last but not least, theoretical and practical aspects were well-balanced and the two outstanding institutions, BME and KFKI, worked hand in hand in making the program successful.

Conclusions

This paper has analysed the Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer program within the context of Cold War Cuban–Hungarian relations and, in general, within the framework of socialist globalization. It has shown how two satellite countries used the fields of science and education to widen their international possibilities and at the same time reinforce their national interests. By cooperating, Cuba could diversify the source of its nuclear know-how, moderate its dependence on the Soviet Union and hopefully get a more “empathetic” partner in the shape of Hungary, being also a satellite country. As for Hungary, educating Cuban nuclear engineers in Budapest also provided the opportunity to train people in the brand-new Paks power plant, whereas the construction of the research reactor in Cuba would have contributed not only to Cuban science and technology (by providing a ZR research reactor) but also to that of the Hungarian side (by learning how to transport and install it in a distant country, that is, how to export such technology).

The (common Cuban and Hungarian) goal of getting some extra room for manoeuvre in the socialist bloc became pointless with its demise. The roles and possibilities of Hungary and Cuba changed, the Soviet hegemon/superpower disappeared, and international relations took a radical turn. Socialist globalization resulted in strong links between European socialist countries and states in the Global South that otherwise, under a different international constellation, where contacts with the West were not limited, would not have been as intensive. Cuba was a very special case, belonging both to the Global South and the socialist world, resulting in prioritized relations between the island and European socialist countries, based on political-ideological foundations. These contacts were, however, conditioned by the bipolar system and the existence of the socialist bloc. Socialist globalization was not possible in a world void of the socialist bloc; the nature of the international entanglements of Hungary changed after 1989/1990. The Hungarian government concentrated on Europe and – temporarily – lost interest in Latin America. Especially so in the case of countries where relations could imply costs, like Cuba. The island struggled to survive without the socialist bloc. Bilateral relations became insignificant – projects and cooperation were suspended and cancelled. This entailed that the Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer MSc program had an ephemeral impact on the Cuban and Hungarian education systems. On the other hand, its influence was significant on the individual level, and it contributed to the creation of a pool of highly trained Cuban nuclear experts.

Table 1

Number of research days spent in KFKI by Cuban visitors

Year	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
No. of days	66	301	714	1,178	1,011

Source(s): Author’s calculation based on the bulletin of the Institute KFKI Tájékoztató, published on a weekly basis

Table 2

Cuban graduates at the Reactor Technology Specialist Engineer program at BME¹

Name	Year of graduation
Alicia Arrebola Diez	1986
Bárbaro Ouintero Leyva	1986
Diego Frias Suárez	1986
Elvira Moré Polanco	1986
Fernando Garcia Yip	1986
Gerardó Garcia Illera	1986
Rodolfo Alfonso Laguardia	1986
Alonso Diosdado Garcia	1988
Damera Arnaldo Martinez	1988
Daniel López Aldama	1988
Guillermo Rogelio Ibanez Duharte	1988
Nereida Catalina Diaz Martinez	1988
Carlos Alberto Caballero Garcia	1990
David Pérez Medina	1990
Juan Teijeiro Amador	1990
Iris Maria Avila Mesa	1990
Maritza Rodriguez Gual	1990
Mayra Espinosa Valdés	1990
Odalys Espinosa Martinez	1990
Orestes Polo Viera	1990

Note(s): ¹ Names are written in the same way as they appear in the university yearbook, however, this does not always correspond to Spanish orthographic rules. The order of graduates is also based on the yearbook. Graduates were listed in alphabetical order, yet in case of foreigners, based on first names (sic) and not family names. (It is not a problem in Hungarian, as names would always start with the family name and first name comes last.)

Source(s): BME (1988, Vol. 2, pp. 629–633); BME (1992, Vol. 1, pp. 324–327); BME (1995, pp. 210–215)

Notes

1. According to Cuban sources, cited in the Hungarian press.

2. In those days the differentiation of the level of courses was different from the Bologna system, which is currently used in Hungary. Yet the closest is a master program (students needed a BSc diploma to be admitted and studies lasted 2 years), which is why I will refer to it as an MSc program throughout this paper.

3. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. An economic organization of the socialist bloc (1949–1991).

4. The agreements, preparatory materials and related correspondence were collected within box 61, in one dossier, numbered 10,314.

5. I conducted oral history interviews with Cuban nuclear specialists who lived approximately 3 years in Hungary in the period between 1983 and 1990 and studied at BME. With the aim of covering the evolution of the MSc program and gaining an overview, one student was selected from each edition of the program, starting in 1984, 1986 and 1988, respectively. The communication channel was MSTeams in all three interviews since interviewees no longer live in Hungary. I also interviewed two of the teachers, already retired, and with residence in Budapest (personal interview and phone interview). In order to preserve anonymity, no names will be indicated in the case of the interviews. They will be differentiated only as Interview, student and Interview, teacher in the references.

6. He had had visits to Hungary in 1977 and 1982; and received the delegation of the Budapest Technological University, led by Rector János Meiser in 1979 in Havana. Rodríguez still held his post in 1991 (Serra, 1991).

7. As for the research reactor, the Cuban side confirmed in February 1988 that it would not be able to receive the necessary equipment before 1991 (MNL OL, 1988).

8. The Comecon was dissolved in June 1991 in Budapest, Hungary.