Google search abuses dominant position to illegally favour Google Shopping: an economic review of the EU decision

Abstract

Purpose

This paper is concerned with the current decision of the European Commission regarding Google’s comparison shopping service (Google Shopping). In 2017, the Commission has fined Google €2.42 billion for abusing its dominant position as a search engine by giving illegal advantage to Google Shopping. Consequently, Google has to stop its illegal conduct. In particular, the decision requires Google to treat rival comparison shopping services and its own service equally. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the decision from a perspective of two-sided markets. Google Shopping is an integrated service of Google Search and acts as an intermediary between companies, offerings products in the internet and people searching for products in the internet. This complies with the typical conditions of a two-sided market. From the perspective of sellers of goods and services in Europe, Google may be seen as a gatekeeper to the potential customers and thus as an essential facility. In the light of the current decision, this paper provides a possible regulation alternative. It is shown that Google Shopping represents a typical club good, so that welfare-optimising rules must be adhered to. In this context, it should be noted that in the current Google Shopping search results, artificial rivalry is created among sellers so as to ensure maximum willingness to pay for a top listing. The solution proposed in this paper entails a summary score list of all sellers of a particular product, for which a turnover-dependent contribution should be required, instead of a reduced score list, where positions are sold by auctions.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper uses methods of two-sided markets and public good theory.

Findings

It is shown that Google Shopping represents a typical club good, so that welfare-optimising rules must be adhered to. In this context, it should be noted that in the current Google Shopping search results, artificial rivalry is created among sellers so as to ensure maximum willingness to pay for a top listing. The solution proposed in this paper entails a summary score list of all sellers of a particular product, for which a turnover-dependent contribution should be required, instead of a reduced score list, where positions are sold by auctions.

Originality/value

To the best of the author’s knowledge, it is the very first paper about the decision of the European Union (06/2017) concerning Google Shopping.

Citation

Blanckenburg, K.v. (2018), "Google search abuses dominant position to illegally favour Google Shopping: an economic review of the EU decision", Digital Policy, Regulation and Governance, Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 211-224. https://doi.org/10.1108/DPRG-05-2017-0020