Governing buyer–supplier relationships to foster relational rents in organic short food supply chains
ISSN: 0007-070X
Article publication date: 4 July 2023
Issue publication date: 10 October 2023
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to analyze the influence of governance mechanisms in the generation of relational rents for supplier in short food supply chains (SFSCs).
Design/methodology/approach
This study used data from a survey of 181 organic producers in SFSCs, using partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) with the aid of the SmartPLS® 3 software for the analysis.
Findings
The results show the relationship between formal and informal governance mechanisms and relational rents. The predominance of informal mechanisms enabled a higher explanatory power than that provided by formal governance mechanisms. Further, the authors found that the complementary use of governance mechanisms has a stronger impact on generating relational rents. However, contextual factors such as relationship time, power asymmetry and uncertainty in demand have not shown any influence on governance mechanisms for generating relational rents.
Originality/value
The result sheds new light on the relevance of governance mechanisms to foster relational rents to suppliers in SFSCs. It also shows that contextual factors that affect relationships in traditional supply chains do not play a relevant role in SFSCs due to their specific characteristics.
Keywords
Acknowledgements
This study financed in part by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior-Brasil (CAPES) - Finance Code 001 and Federal Institute of Education, Science and Technology of Rio Grande do Sul (IFRS).
Citation
Cislaghi, T.P., Wegner, D., Vieira, L.M. and Zanandrea, G. (2023), "Governing buyer–supplier relationships to foster relational rents in organic short food supply chains", British Food Journal, Vol. 125 No. 10, pp. 3679-3697. https://doi.org/10.1108/BFJ-12-2022-1073
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
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