Corporate disclosure and financing arrangements: Evidence from syndicated loans in emerging markets
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to explore how firms’ disclosure standards influence the syndicated loan market, with an emphasis on loan syndicate structure and composition.
Design/methodology/approach
To empirically investigate the effects of corporate disclosure on bank loan syndicate structure and composition, the authors hand-match Dealscan, Worldscope, and other databases and construct a sample across 11 emerging markets.
Findings
The authors found that lead banks retain less ownership and form a less-concentrated loan syndicate when borrowers have superior disclosure policies. The authors also concluded that lead banks select more foreign participants in a loan syndicate and these members retain more ownership when borrowers have high disclosure rankings. Finally, the authors present evidence that the relationship between corporate disclosure and bank loan syndicates is more significant for firms with better governance.
Originality/value
The findings suggest that corporate disclosure has a significant influence on financing arrangements, even in a weak governance environment.
Keywords
Acknowledgements
JEL Classification —M41, G15, G24, G38
Dr Liang Song finished portions of this research when he was an assistant professor of accounting at University of Massachusetts Dartmouth and a visiting scholar at the Bank of Finland, Finland. This work was started as a part of Dr Liang Song’s dissertation for a PhD at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
Citation
Hasan, I., Song, L., Zhan, M., Zhang, P. and Zhang, Z. (2015), "Corporate disclosure and financing arrangements: Evidence from syndicated loans in emerging markets", Asian Review of Accounting, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 139-155. https://doi.org/10.1108/ARA-01-2014-0020
Publisher
:Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2015, Emerald Group Publishing Limited