A Normative Assessment of Transport Network Reliability based on Game Theory

Abstract

This paper describes and extends the game theoretic approach to network vulnerability assessment. The basic idea is to set up a game between the network users who are trying to minimise their expected travel time by choice of route and a network tester who is trying to penalise the users most by degrading a link through capacity reduction leading to congestion. The method therefore finds the worst possible location for a link degradation, taking re-routing options into account (an upper, lower bound of impact). The original game identifies the weakest link for routes between an OD pair in the network. Two variations are introduced in this paper in order to determine the weak links for a specific origin or a specific destination and for the whole network. All three game variations are tested on a small network in Leicester and the results are presented.

Citation

Cassir, C., Bell, M.G.H. and Schmöcker, J.-D. (2003), "A Normative Assessment of Transport Network Reliability based on Game Theory", Bell, M.G.H. and Iida, Y. (Ed.) The Network Reliability of Transport, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 225-244. https://doi.org/10.1108/9781786359544-013