“Imposed” Standards Induced Protectionism in International Trade: A Game Theoretic Exploration

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the welfare effects of product standards (which fall under Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)) on an exporting country when the country by its own choice prefers to follow the null standard for the domestic market, which is not possible due to high set up cost at two different standards. The model has used a theoretical framework to analyze the effects and has derived some important results. If the standard is not linked with a true negative externality, the exporting country, given the assumptions of the model will always prefer to be discriminated by “tariff” and the importing country will prefer to protect its market by “tariff” rather than going for NTB. The typical assumptions taken here resemble the trade between developed and developing countries when the developed country imposes some minimum standard on a product but becomes relatively “costly” for the developing country to comply with. As the importing country is not free to set tariffs, it will use NTB as a minimum standard (as it is welfare-improving than free trade). However, the minimum standard also affects the exporting country's local producers and consumers. So NTB leads to a worse situation for both countries and definitely worst for the exporting country. Using a game theoretic framework, the study shows that the imposition of standards which does not address any real externality can be an optimum response for an importing country leading to a loss in the global welfare compared to a free trade situation.

Citation

Chakraborty, A.S. (2024), "“Imposed” Standards Induced Protectionism in International Trade: A Game Theoretic Exploration", Bhattacharyya, R. and Mazumdar, D. (Ed.) Contemporary Issues in International Trade, Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 161-178. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-83797-320-020241010