Codifying the principles of a welfare state: An analysis of “MacArthur’s Constitution” for Japan

Abstract

The present study provides a comparison of the Confederate Constitution of 1861 and the Japanese Constitution of 1946, with emphasis on the role of constitutional constraints on pork‐barrel legislation and increasing rates of federal spending. Because the Japanese Constitution, by all accounts, was produced by Americans (American General Douglas MacArthur and the SCAP), it provided a second possibility for Americans, who had the benefit of hindsight regarding the shortcomings of the US Constitution, to potentially make an improvement. Unlike the view maintained by the Confederate States of America in the drafting of a constitution, MacArthur’s product actually relaxed constraints on central government spending. The result, the apparent product of the new dealism and progressivism ideologies which were prevalent in 1940s America, has produced an open door to increased levels of special interest spending in Japan.

Citation

Mixon, F.G. and Wilkinson, J.B. (2000), "Codifying the principles of a welfare state: An analysis of “MacArthur’s Constitution” for Japan", International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 27 No. 4, pp. 272-285. https://doi.org/10.1108/03068290010286564