Chapter 12 The Theory of Dispute Resolution with Application to Intellectual Property Rights

Abstract

We survey several of the theoretical models that have been applied to the analysis of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement process. These include repeated game models, which emphasize the punishment aspect of dispute settlement, and incomplete contracting models, which emphasize the “gap-filling” aspect. Our analysis emphasizes the implications of these models for the strengthening of the dispute settlement process under the WTO and for its application to the TRIPS agreement. We also discuss how models of settlement bargaining can be applied to obtain empirical predictions about which cases will actually proceed to an actual finding by the dispute panel.

Citation

Beshkar, M. and Bond, E.W. (2007), "Chapter 12 The Theory of Dispute Resolution with Application to Intellectual Property Rights", Maskus, K.E. (Ed.) Intellectual Property, Growth and Trade (Frontiers of Economics and Globalization, Vol. 2), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 391-422. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-8715(07)00012-7