ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SURVEY

Abstract

During recent years, financial economists have made a significant contribution to the rapid development of a vibrant and growing literature on organization structure and corporate governance. In reviewing the development of this literature, it becomes easy to see how the seminal contributions of Ronald Coase (awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991) have become the cornerstone of a new institutional economics. In particular, researchers following in Coase’s footsteps have clarified the conditions under which voluntary contracts between private agents can resolve a wide variety of so-called “agency problems.” More than just representing an important discovery of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy, Coase’s work has become an important foundation for the theory of contracts and for the whole field of “organization economics.”

Citation

Hirschey, M. (2003), "ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SURVEY", Advances in Financial Economics (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 8), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 65-112. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3732(03)08004-6